One of the major criticisms of former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy approach was his contribution to bridging the rift between the great powers in the United Nations Security Council over his country’s nuclear programme.
Ahmadinejad’s incendiary comments on the nuclear issue, his poor performance on foreign policy and his populist approach to regional problems had encouraged Washington and Moscow to get over their differences and establish a united front against Iran’s nuclear policies. Ahmadinejad’s mistakes resulted in a couple of UN Security Council resolutions — 1737 and 1747 — which almost strangled Iran and closed the circle on it. These resolutions could not have been possible without coordinated US-Russia efforts in the UN Security Council. President Ahmadinejad’s policy, which at the time reflected the rising power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had encouraged even China to join efforts in the Security Council to penalise Tehran for “defying” the great powers”.
Ahmadinejad’s endeavours to step up uranium enrichment to 20 per cent set off alarm bells in the West and around the world. The US joined several European allies in a drive to enlist Russian and Chinese support to apply new pressure on Iran to halt its “suspected” nuclear activities. The Barack Obama administration made significant success in that. The American and European sanctions of 2012 have crippled the Iranian economy as they targeted Iran’s oil industry and banking system. The western embargo on Iran’s oil export cost the country more than half of its oil revenues, further destabilising the waning economy.
Since the ascendance of president Ahmadinejad to power in August 2005, and until his departure earlier this year, Iran was, wittingly or unwittingly, alienating Moscow and pushing it slowly towards joining the western front. Iran took many steps that justified this change of heart by the Russian government. The Russians moved closer to the American view, in part because Iran rebuffed a compromise proposal to swap enriched uranium for nuclear fuel with the assistance of both Russia and France. In January 2010, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it did not accept the terms of the deal agreed to in October by Iran, the IAEA and the P5+1 — the US, Russia, China, UK and France plus Germany. This refusal made it easier for the Obama administration to persuade the Russians to endorse the conclusion that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The Russians were embarrassed when Iran swept aside the proposal they made and looked as if they had no influence whatsoever over their Iranian friends. The last blow to the Russians came when Iran ignored a last-minute effort by a Russian envoy to persuade it not to take provocative action such as stepping up uranium enrichment.
After alienating Russia, Iran began to rely more on China’s opposition to any new round of sanctions in the UN Security Council, but great power interests and bargains reigned supreme. China got on board and supported the two UN Security Council resolutions against Iran.
Over the past eight years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran has learnt that it can indeed challenge US policies in the region, but cannot afford confronting the collective will of the great powers. The ascendance of the pragmatic Hassan Rouhani to power this year was the direct outcome of learning that tough lesson in foreign policy.
Rouhani’s new foreign policy approach seems to have had significant impact on the first round of talks between Iran and the big powers since the election of the Iranian president in June. Last Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif kicked off a two-day meeting with the P5+1 in Geneva, with a presentation titled ‘Closing an Unnecessary Crisis: Opening New Horizons’. The presentation was met with optimism and the Iranian delegation made a proposal to scale back its efforts at uranium enrichment.
The US responded quickly to the Iranian proposal when it hinted that there could be potential sanctions relief for Iran if Tehran took swift measures to address concerns about its nuclear programme. Indeed, nobody expect a breakthrough overnight. Yet, months of conciliatory diplomacy between the US and president Rouhani seems to have worked very well for Iran. Many would like to argue that the new Iranian approach is mere tactic and that its main goal is to evade the sanctions. That may very well be true. Yet, what counts here for Iran is to prevent the repetition of Ahmadinejad’s experience which led to unity amongst the great powers against Iran’s policies. Bringing Iran out of the cold is certainly Rouhani’s primary objective and it seems that he is doing well.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is the dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Diplomacy at the University of Kalamoon, Damascus.
