More than five years after the fall of Baghdad it is still difficult to separate the losers from the winners in the ongoing power struggle that kicked off almost immediately following the collapse of the Saddam Hussain regime.
The bloody battles that raged in Basra and other southern towns recently between followers of Moqtada Al Sadr and government security forces reminded the world that five years on Iraq was still falling into a bottomless pit. Al Sadr's Mahdi Army proved to be more than equal to government's forces, which had to call for US and British support.
The clampdown, ordered by beleaguered Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, had failed, and the premier had to stand down and endure humiliation. This was to be the first real test for the new Iraqi army, but the political repercussions of this failure are more threatening.
President George W. Bush had lauded Al Maliki's gambit and described the government's operation in Basra as a defining moment for Iraq. And maybe it was. Al Sadr emerged from the confrontation as the most powerful Shiite symbol proving that he commands the will of millions of his followers in the south and in Baghdad itself.
On the other hand, the battles deepened the rift within various Shiite groups and parties, and left Al Maliki and his struggling Cabinet more isolated than before.
Shaky truce
More importantly, perhaps, was the revelation last week that the shaky truce was reached after Tehran's intervention with both sides. If anything such mediation strengthens Iran's hands in the internal affairs of its neighbour. By the same token it undermines US efforts to dictate the next point on the Iraqi government's agenda.
For the Americans Al Sadr has demonstrated that he is a tough nut to crack. He has survived previous attempts to contain him and his budding army.
He has honoured a year-long truce with the foreign forces and kept his followers on the sidelines as the Americans focused their attention on Al Qaida and other "insurgents" especially in the Sunni provinces.
But in return he was able to control Basra and exploit oil exports from its ports. Government influence over the south remained weak and ineffective.
The young mullah maintained contacts with Tehran and pulled his ministers from Al Maliki's Cabinet ostensibly in protest of its policies but probably as a show of defiance. He demanded that the government set a clear deadline for US military withdrawal from Iraq, a position which boosted his popularity with Shiite youth.
It is difficult to ascertain how successful the surge in US troops has been. As the US increased the number of its military personnel and worked with local Sunni tribes to create the "Awakening Councils" to counter and chase away Al Qaida militants, the number of deadly attacks against civilians and foreign forces dropped considerably in the second half of the last year.
The plan appeared to be working, until a few weeks ago when suicide and others attacks suddenly surged in the north and in Baghdad itself.
The Green Zone, sanctuary to parliament, the government and the US command, was hit repeatedly in the past few weeks. The number of daily attacks was on the rise and the US response appeared excessive and off balance.
It is not clear who is behind the recent escalation in violence across the country. And Al Maliki's decision to hit Al Sadr's followers in Basra was sudden and unexpected.
It was not the best time for his shaky coalition government to launch such an operation. He had been struggling to keep his Cabinet afloat in spite of the departure of Sunni parties and Al Sadr's walk-out last year. He has been frequently portrayed as weak and indecisive, especially after Turkey's incursion into northern Iraq a few weeks ago.
Still America does not appear to have a better ally at the moment. It had alienated the more secular Shiite politicians in the past, and was peeved when Al Maliki paid Tehran an official visit last year and recently received President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Baghdad.
The recent crisis has split the Shiite alliance both inside the political process and outside it. Al Sadr's call for the occupiers to leave soon is resonating across Iraq and for different reasons.
Al Maliki cannot make such a commitment without risking Washington's wrath. At best all parties are waiting for the US presidential elections to unwind before making their positions clear.
For the average Iraqi, Al Maliki's government has been a complete failure. Lawlessness and violence are still rampant while basic services such as clean water, electricity, fuel and medicine remain poor or non-existent in some areas.
National reconciliation efforts are bogged down, and the Iraqi security forces are inept and their loyalties remain uncertain as the Basra confrontations have proven. Sectarian tensions are high in many areas and Kurdish national aspirations have not been satisfied.
In short the future of Iraq is enigmatic, and the recent setback for Al Maliki may usher in a new political phase. The Bush administration is not helping much. The Awakening Councils are dependent on regular infusion of US funds and their role in the future is a worrying matter for many Iraqis.
At the moment it appears that Tehran and its allies in Iraq are keeping their cards close to their chests. A Shiite split does not serve Iran's interests and so the current crisis may be contained temporarily.
But in the long run Washington will have to examine its few options in Iraq. Al Sadr's Mahdi Army will not be overrun and any attempt to restrain it will come at a high political price for any central government.
If either of the US Democratic contenders wins the November presidential elections he or she will have to study closely the price of carrying out the promise to pull out US troops.
Every possible scenario is now on the table and none looks comfortable or assuring, not only for the US and the West but for the Arab side as well.
Osama Al Sharif is a veteran journalist based in Jordan.
