The Brexit debate is a movie we have seen many times before. “We want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose. But it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one’s own country.” This is a good position for fighting the forthcoming referendum. But those are not the words of David Cameron; it was Margaret Thatcher in Bruges in September 1988. It is time for this recurring drama to have a new script.
Fifty-three years ago, as a newly minted American Fulbright scholar at the London School of Economics, I was passing TUC headquarters as the Labour party leadership stood on the steps to denounce Britain’s bid to join the European Economic Community. I was torn between my Fabian supervisor at LSE, Bill Pickles, who was a “hell, no”, and Chatham House’s Andrew Shonfield, who was a “definitely, yes”. Andrew won the struggle for my soul. But I soon understood that Britain’s heart wasn’t in it. Further, as the French suspected, the US government saw Britain as our Trojan horse in Europe - I witnessed that when I later worked in the White House. President de Gaulle was right, at the time, in saying “non” to Britain’s application. Partly this was due to the battle for leadership and influence. But there was also a valid assessment of Britain’s continuing reluctance to become truly “European”. Over the years I have observed that Britain has rarely, if ever, seen its place as being within the continent. ( Sir Humphrey Appleby expressed it best: “Our European Community enemies ... er, partners.”) I have never detected a resolute commitment to being a “good European” on the part of any British government, no attempt to move past centuries of holding aloof except when needed to help maintain the balance of power on the continent.
Even the primary lesson of the 20th century’s European civil war - which was that Britain needs to be a permanent, committed participant in continental affairs - has failed to take hold. I have long detected a streak in “Official Britain” determined to keep the European experiment from succeeding, despite Britain’s lead role in the 1940s European Movement . The so-called “three circles policy” - Europe, Commonwealth, and the United States - always contained an internal tension, especially between nurturing the “special relationship” while advancing Britain’s interests and influence on the continent. I saw this tension directly in 1993 when I became US ambassador to Nato. In my first meeting with my British counterpart, he had one thing in mind: how to sidetrack the Western European Union - now the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.
Her Majesty’s Government believed the WEU would undercut Nato and transatlantic ties. I disagreed. As someone committed both to the Atlantic Alliance and to European integration, I judged that Nato would naturally remain the senior partner and the US commitment to European security would remain solid. There would only be one set of military forces, not two, and Nato could insist on having the right of first refusal in their use. The US thus parted from Britain in backing a strong WEU, and Nato does remain pre-eminent, with America as its lead element. Britain reached another point of decision when Nato and what is now the European Union decided to take in new members from central Europe. British policy seemed obvious to me: keep Nato small so it will work and make the EU large so it will not work.
Thus with Nato’s enlargement decision in 1997, London supported adding Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, then full stop. But Britain managed only half its goal: at 28 current members and still growing, Nato has become unwieldy and faces deep stresses between its older and newer European members. London did get its wish with the EU, which has also grown to 28 members - a major factor in its current dysfunction. Sir Humphrey was validated: “The more members [the EU] has, the more arguments it can stir up, the more futile and impotent it becomes.” Britain must now again decide what role it wants to play in the two remaining circles of policy - the Commonwealth having dropped by the wayside. We Americans continue formally to endorse the “special relationship”: after all, it works more for us than for Britain. But we also wonder how Britain can be truly useful to us, and to the west in general, if it chooses to stand apart in Europe rather than exert its proper weight in crucial matters. Having watched the same debate, over and over for more than half a century, I wish that our British friends would make a firm and lasting decision, one way or the other, and then work hard in light of whichever way it goes to do what is best for Britain, Europe, and transatlantic ties. I hope the answer will be to stop the repeated dithering and “stay the course”. This means thinking more about where to “opt in” rather than where to “opt out”, staying fully engaged in the EU, and working whole-heartedly to strengthen - and where possible lead on - both western security and the European experiment. As we Americans say, Britain needs finally to “fish or cut bait”.
— Guardian News & Media Ltd, 2016
Robert Hunter is currently Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies.
