Anyone who doubts that the wars in Iraq and Syria are closely connected need look no further than the role of Al Qaida’s Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, whose fighters have been pouring over the Syrian border into Iraq’s Anbar Province. If not handled carefully, developments in Iraq and Syria could transform the map of the Middle East and incite further conflict in the coming years.
What is happening in Anbar is nothing less than a fight for the existence of Iraq in its current borders. As much as Iraq’s Sunnis fear for their future, the Shiite majority, now overseeing the untested proposition of a Shiite-led Arab state, also have reasons to be fearful. Even paranoids have enemies. While Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki should devote more effort to negotiating and compromising with the Sunni community than he has to cracking down on its leaders and activists, he nonetheless has before him the daunting task of consolidating a Shiite-led Iraqi state with no natural allies in the rest of the Arab world. And the Sunni community, now buffeted by Al Qaida on one side and the Shiite state on the other, has never had much interest in helping Al Maliki stabilise Iraq’s new political order.
Al Qaida’s strategy in Iraq is to deal harshly with those they consider to be Sunni collaborators with the Shiite-led central government in Baghdad, and then to deal with the government itself. It is a brutal strategy, but it seems to be effective.
Already, police and military checkpoints are beginning to look like border crossings, essentially cutting off Sunni-dominated Anbar from the rest of Iraq. And while those internal checkpoints are being reinforced, the actual border with Sunni-dominated parts of Syria is becoming more porous by the day.
Surely, Iraqi voters could find a better leader than Al Maliki to steer the country through these troubled times; with a general election set for April 30, maybe they will. But it is not at all clear that Iraq’s Sunnis are ready to accept any Shiite leadership. They may detest Al Maliki, but their community has never signaled its willingness to support another Shiite leader who credibly represents Shiite political power.
To the uninitiated, the effort in 2010 to unite Sunnis behind the Iraq National Movement (Iraqiya) coalition, with a “secular Shiite” as its leader, seemed like a promising step toward post-sectarian politics. But few Iraqis were fooled. Iraqiya’s Shiite leader never once campaigned in southern Iraq, where most Shiites live. Apart from a small number of highly educated, secular Shiites from Baghdad, Iraqiya never attracted substantial Shiite support.
On the contrary, many Shiite perceived Iraqiya as a thinly disguised effort to roll back Shiite gains and restore Sunni rule. The Sunnis, after all, are no more secular than the Shiites; they simply have an interest in reducing the importance of a sectarian identity that dooms them to minority status.
Inter-communal consensus
Syria’s bloody conflict is often described as an Iranian war, an effort to keep Syria’s Sunni majority in check and build power and prestige throughout the Levant. Likewise, Iraq’s Sunnis lament Iranian influence over the Iraqi government, which is far greater than at any time in recent centuries.
But Iraq’s Shiites are Iraqis and Arabs first, and Shiite second. It is no surprise that they want a better relationship with Iran than Saddam Hussain had. In fact, it was entirely predictable. The United States and others may frown upon Iraq’s close ties with Iran, but the time to think about that was before the US-led invasion in 2003.
Given the strength and territorial concentration of Iraq’s Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish communities, any successful Iraqi government must find ways to rule the country through inter-communal consensus. That is Al Maliki’s task; it will be the task of the next prime minister, too. But, in the current climate, it is difficult to imagine that naming an additional Sunni minister would stop the wave of suicide bombers dispatched by Al Qaida — a group not known to negotiate power-sharing deals.
Iraq and Syria are unlikely to solve their problems on their own. The departure of the US military from Iraq, particularly those forces that helped to pacify Anbar against heavy odds, is permanent. But the US needs to be heavily engaged politically in support of the central government, and confine its criticism of Al Maliki to private channels. It is a positive sign that Vice-President Joe Biden continues to reach out to Al Maliki.
Nonetheless, Iraq and Syria need far more external help than they are receiving. Egyptian diplomats often played the most significant role in the region, but now Egypt is preoccupied with its domestic travails and will remain so for years to come. Turkey has tried to play an active role, but its efforts have not always been well received among Arabs. Meanwhile, the Saudis do not appear to want to mediate between Shiite and Sunnis, or even between rival Sunnis.
The Geneva process on Syria is the right approach. The US, in particular, should bear in mind that success on some power-sharing arrangement in Syria may be the best way to create room for Iraq’s central government to make overdue gestures to the Sunnis. Progress toward a stable political order in either country is likely to lead to similar progress in the other.
— Project Syndicate, 2014
Christopher R. Hill, former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, is Dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.
