Just weeks before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif got elected, an Indian television anchor asked him if he would give General Pervez Ashfaque Kayani another extension. Nawaz Sharif’s response was categorical: “Whoever is the senior-most will have to occupy the seat.” However, when it came to appointing the new chief, the Pakistan prime minister has done it a little differently. Having to choose from a group of four generals, Sharif knocked out the senior-most, appointed the number one as Chairman Joint Chief-of-Staffs Committee and appointed the number three, General Raheel Sharif, as the new army chief. General Sharif has replaced general Kayani — Pakistan’s longest-serving army chief of a civilian era.
In fact, with the finalisation of the new chief justice of Pakistan to succeed the present chief justice, who retires on December 12, it is a moment of celebration for Pakistanis. Having weathered endless political storms, including several military coups, finally, in 2013, at the age of 66, Pakistan completed its first ever democratic transition.
Nawaz’s earlier experience with all army chiefs has not been less than action-packed. He fired one, vicious propaganda floated against Nawaz in a section of the media, when one serving chief died of heart attack, and the two chiefs appointed by him sent him packing. General Pervez Musharraf, his 1998 choice, first undertook the blundering Kargil operation. Subsequently, he sent Sharif to jail, when Sharif dismissed the airborne chief. It all reads like a story of intrigue and adolescent blunders. That is what it has been like. Unfortunately, at a very high cost to the Pakistani state and society and to much else. While Pakistan blundered between military dictators and erring elected leaders, the business of state has been a bit of an alien fact for us. General Sharif comes with experience in command, instruction and training, but perhaps reportedly none in counter-insurgency — currently Pakistan’s core security requirement. He was trained in Pakistan, UK and Canadian military academies. Commissioned in 1976 in the sixth battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment, the new chief has commanded the Gujranwala Corps, 11th Infantry Division in Lahore and two brigades. He has been Commandant of the Pakistan Military Academy and instructor at the National Defence University. Sharif comes from an army stock with his older brother Major Shabbir Sharif having been martyred during the 1971 war with India.
His last posting was at the general headquarters as inspector general Training and Evaluation and he oversaw the training of Pakistan Army. He was also awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz, the second highest civilian award — an honour that is given to both civilians and military officers of the Pakistan armed forces.
General Sharif, the prime minister’s namesake, is not related to him but is known to the Sharif family and has served under Pakistan Muslim League parliamentarian, general Qadir Baloch. How the new chief uses the experienced counter-insurgency men like General Tariq Khan in his team will determine how effectively the Pakistan Army will be able to push back terrorism. Interestingly, the last post he held as inspector general Training and Evaluation, though important, was not a post from which traditionally generals became chiefs. But then, in 1999 too, Sharif had picked a general from the Engineering Corps to become army chief, although for only a couple of hours.
Meanwhile coup-making is now probably a business of the past. Predictions may be fool’s play in matters of power-play. Yet, all developments flow from a context-bound dynamic. In Pakistan, with growing fault-lines, deepening insecurity, men in uniform will be forced by circumstances to stray from the constitutional path. Hence the chances of the army chief as the future man on horseback, are now greatly reduced. Also, no less the national consensus against military coups is getting stronger, requiring men in khaki to stay within their barracks.
Nonetheless, the army leadership still remains relevant in the security realm. The questions, therefore, around the eligibility of the new army chief, beyond of course being professionally competent, are also about how willing is he to align the orientation of the institution he leads, with the elected government’s policies on key security areas. For decades they have called the shots, taken key foreign policy and security decisions on Afghanistan, India and the US. Hence, to implement its own policies in any of these areas, an elected government needs the army as willing players. The prime minister remains conscious of this fact.
In the days ahead, there will be three key security and foreign policy areas on which the new army chief will be tested for his constitutionally-required backing and assistance to elected authority.
One, the fight against terrorism and linked to that, the army’s distancing from the militant groups. Both are work-in-progress with the previous chief having tried to deal with these issues in a gradualist mode. Beyond vague dialogue and heightened anti-American rhetoric, decisions need to be taken on confronting militants in a consequential way, for example by hitting at their bases. Also on the related issue of US’s unilateral drone attacks in which more than 1,500 innocent Pakistani civilians and more than 35 well-known terrorists have been killed, it is time to clear the web of huge contradictions that Pakistan itself has woven over the years. A huge segment of public opinion has being mobilised against them by Imran Khan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) leader. Last Tuesday, the PTI named CIA’s Pakistan station chief in an FIR registered for the Hangu drone attacks, which left eight people dead. Pakistan Army, that had earlier itself sought US drone support to target militants, is now being forced to review its position. It looks to the civilian setup for direction.
Two, how to deal with India? It is an area where troubles do not seem to end, with the Line of Control on the boil, and yet the elected prime minister remains committed to enhancing ties with New Delhi. Only recently, the Pakistan prime minister called for visa-free travel.
Three, how does Pakistan proceed in Afghanistan — both on the political reconciliation and the transition beyond 2014? Again, Prime Minister Sharif is clear that trust-building with Kabul, irrespective of who sits there in power, is in Pakistan’s interest. During the last few weeks, Sharif himself led Pakistan’s efforts to improve the trust level with Kabul. He has effectively moved away from Pakistan’s earlier policy of considering Afghanistan Taliban as an asset. In the last few weeks, the prime minister had long sessions with the military leadership to bring them on board. Sharif leaves for Kabul today. Clearly he will take Pakistan’s new military chief along.
Prime Minister Sharif has a plan for course correction of Pakistan’s security policies. He is reportedly confident that his new army chief will embrace the policy that the country’s elected chief executive proposes. Having set up the institutional framework for comprehensive consultations and policy-making, the Cabinet Committee on National Security and Foreign policy, the prime minister believes he will oversee the policy-making and policy execution process and avoid any independent moves by the military leadership.
Significantly, with constitutional changeovers in all the powerful positions, we can look forward to stable times. Yet, of course, what will determine relative accord within Pakistani society and the responsible performance of the government and state is how wisely constitutional authority is exercised to effectively address peoples’ basic needs, including physical security, and tackle the issues of governance.
Nasim Zehra is a writer on security issues.
