Pakistan is at present rocked by a bizarre episode in its dual histories: the one plotting the curve of civil-military relations and the other a narrative of uneven relations with the US. The latter is becoming increasingly toxic because of unresolved differences on Afghanistan and was at least partly responsible for the event dubbed Memogate by the country's irrepressible media.
The scandal has claimed its first victim in the form of Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to the US, who resigned on Tuesday over the allegations.
In brief, Memogate centres on the alleged collaboration between Haqqani — a Pakistan People's Party appointee — and Mansoor Ijaz, an affluent expatriate of Pakistani origin in a poorly conceived bid to dent the influence of the Pakistan army and the ISI, with American help.
US assistance was sought by conjuring up the spectre of an impending military coup by the army in a secret memo to Admiral Mike Mullen, former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Americans were told that humiliated by their audacious raid to kill Osama Bin Laden on May 2, the Pakistani army was all set to overthrow the civilian government.
According to Ijaz, the memo was written by him in close collaboration with Haqqani who also conveyed clearance from Haqqani's "boss", a reference to President Asif Ali Zardari.
The existence of the memo has been confirmed by Mullen as well as by James Logan Jones, former US National Security Adviser and a retired general, who transmitted it to the admiral.
The memo contained an incredible offer. Washington was to have all its hitherto unmet demands fulfilled by the new security team that a grateful Zardari would presumably put together in close consultation with the Americans. Pakistan would virtually turn into an American protectorate with its foreign and security policy, including its nuclear capability, firmly under American control.
Where the authors of the hair-brained memo obviously went wrong was the fact that the Americans would have picked up intimations of the planned coup before anyone else and secondly, they knew that the army and its powerful intelligence outfits could not be so easily vanquished.
Nobody in the American administration thought that the glib offer deserved much attention. Exactly five months after delivering it, Ijaz blew the whistle mysteriously by reporting it in an Op-Ed piece published by the Financial Times. I wrote a short piece asking for government clarification since the memo could be "true, half-true or a total figment of Ijaz's imagination". This low key disposal of the affair was quickly swept aside by a cacophony of voices demanding a treason trial as Ijaz put all the blame on Haqqani and the latter retaliated by declaring Ijaz to be the only culprit.
It is a measure of the steep decline in Pakistan's statecraft and political maturity that these two individuals have unleashed forces that, if unchecked, are capable of pulling the entire governmental edifice down.
Haqqani began as a talented journalist who made his considerable skills of media management and spin doctoring available, in succession, to Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League and eventually the PPP. In popular perception, his forte was the alleged use of ‘dirty tricks'.
During the last three years, he has wielded a compelling influence on Zardari's decisions, relegating successive foreign ministers and the foreign office to a secondary role.
Ijaz has been active in the politics of the Democratic Party and claims to have had close links with US political, military and intelligence leaders.
There is no evidence that Zardari was directly involved in the preposterous project but that does not deter the opposition from alleging that he tried to achieve his old ambition of cutting the military down to size at a time when Washington was prepared to believe the worst about it.
Beyond the shenanigans of Zardari's minions, the fracas is a strong reminder of the enduring distrust between Pakistan's political class and the military. The military has had a well-defined posture since Pervez Musharraf's ouster: it does not plan to take over but it is concerned about Pakistan's worsening political and economic situation.
The army knows military intervention could deepen the national crisis, not resolve it. This built-in restraint may still help defuse the situation. The obvious ingredients for de-escalation are that Zardari (a) appoints a new ambassador to Washington who does not try setting the political chessboard with US assistance and (b) reins in elements who provoke confrontations with the military.
The first step has been taken with Sherry Rehman being named as Haqqani's replacement. Now, it is to be seen if the army intensifies efforts to allay Zardari's deep-seated apprehensions about its intentions.
Tanvir Ahmad Khan has served as Pakistan's ambassador to several states and also as foreign secretary.
