Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi must take the bull by the horns and revamp the country’s political and economic system once and for all. This is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity as he completes his first year in office and starts another, albeit a gloomy one. All through the summer months, he has been facing continuous popular pressure for reforms.
The debonair politician, who became prime minister last year, must put his courteous political clothing and his consensus-based stances behind and start dealing with the affairs of the country in a realistic, tough-minded manner with less timidity and more emphasis on action.
He must make it clear to hard-hitting politicians in the Iraqi parliament, who grew up in a mixture of political cultures related to suppressive rule and western-minded liberal democracies, that political reform is needed to get the country out of its current rut, with violence, apathy, destruction and political backstabbing taking centre stage.
This should foretell a constructive political dialogue with the requisite parameters — the art of diplomacy and talking with fellow opposition leaders, rather than the usual brouhaha of Iraqi parliamentary democracy. The point should be hammered by him and his proteges that political pluralism should filter into the society, where gains and benefits are distributed evenly and not hijacked and contained within fixed cliques, religious groups and upper classes.
But this may be easier said than done because politics is not just about theory, but related to the practical part as well. Without a doubt Iraq is at a historical crossroads. It will continue to be regarded as a failed state and this is sad because it is a major oil producer with much potential. However, the country currently just doesn’t seem to be able to get its act together due to a faltering political system based on patronage and clientele of kin, friends and supporters, as well as a culture of corruption running right through the political system. Bribery is common practice with many of the members of the bursting-at-the-seams bureaucracy, where three million people, or 45 per cent of the population, are employed.
This is not to forget the administrative malaise and poor management systems, despite an educated population that once made the country regarded as a nation of readers. The prime minister knows only too well the financial problems of keeping such a workforce running — money that could be well-spent elsewhere.
Al Abadi and his Cabinet, which he cut down by a third last month, need to start moving, institute changes, reduce sinecures and introduce mass administrative reforms to create as near an ideal model as he can to serve desperate Iraqis and establish strong relations with the rest of the region, instead of concentrating on a few countries.
Iran, for instance, is no longer seen as Iraq’s only political master. Thanks to Al Abadi, hands are being extended to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan. Saudi Arabia has re-established political relations with Baghdad and has just opened its embassy there — closed since the 1991 US-lead war to get Saddam Hussain out of Kuwait.
Al Abadi knows Iraq’s problems are only the tip of the iceberg. For one, the transformation from a dictatorship based on one-party Baathist rule — as was the case under Saddam — to a parliamentary system with fractious multi-parties, has its own problems when the country is based on sectarianism with the presence of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — not to mention the other minorities such as Yazidis. They are all seeking a slice of the pie, particularly the Shiites who are now in control. They are behaving like a bear with a sore head, due to being long disenfranchised from Iraqi politics. Today, Shiite political parties seek to monopolise the political system while attempting to exclude the Sunnis and the Kurds.
This became crystal clear under the premiership of Nouri Al Maliki between 2006 and 20014, who was only dislodged from power after being pressured by the country’s high religious authority of Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Al Maliki continuously discriminated against anyone who was not a Shiite, unlike the urbane Al Abadi who is trying to reintegrate Sunnis into the country’s political mainstream and get them to play a more meaningful role in the security apparatus, which is currently the preserve of Shiites. Al Abadi wants to do this through a new National Guard that would give provinces the right to establish their own security forces affiliated to the Iraqi army. At present, however, this is being held hostage in parliament at the whims of Shiite blocs who fear it would give Sunnis and other minorities more military and political clout.
Understanding the political realities of the country and the region, Al Abadi is of the view that Sunnis and Kurds need to be armed in the western and northern parts of Iraq to fight Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), who already control a third of the country, reaching up to Mosul, which was first captured by the terror organisation in June 2014.
Further controversy came about with the discovery of 55,000 “ghost soldiers” who were supposed to be defending the region, but in reality only existed on the books so they could continue receiving salaries and line the pockets of their superiors.
This controversy implicated Al Maliki who now stands accused of having allowed the rise of Daesh. This is the point where Iraq is now: Internal sectarian political strife, the rise of Daesh and previously Al Qaida elements, sandwiched by states such as Iran, which arguably still has a stranglehold on the country.
It means Al Abadi will have his hands full over the next 12 months and he will need to tread carefully but firmly, establish new friends and not baulked by enemies.
A footnote: The powercuts and lack of water experienced for much of the summer in Iraq, with temperatures shooting past 50 degrees Celsius, have suddenly led to the realisation that things were not working. The fact that the power outage had been in existence for the last two decades, seemed to have been forgotten as Iraq experienced a late Arab Spring, when a young man demonstrating in Basra for better standards of living, was shot dead by the authorities. This indeed started the popular revolt not only in one or two cities but in dozens all over the country.
Although popular revolts in Iraq over the years seemed to have been controlled, could it be the straw that broke the camel’s back? What would this mean for the beleaguered Iraqi premier? Will his changes at the top, chopping off fat by dismissing all three vice-presidents as well as a host of other functionaries, be enough?
He must do more than merely tinker with the political system. And observers will be watching with keen interest as events unfold.
Marwan Asmar is a commentator based in Amman. He has long worked in journalism and has a PhD in Political Science from Leeds University in the UK.
