When the 36-year-old, 11,779 gross-tonne, Egyptian ferry Al-Salam Boccaccio 98 sank in the Red Sea in February 2006 with the loss of around 1,000 lives, there was outcry and anger throughout the region and serious underlying concern within the shipping industry.

From the earliest indications following the disaster there were clear signs that safety management systems had failed and these suspicions were proved entirely correct after the findings of the subsequent enquiry. As in all of these cases, implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was scrutinised and the subsequent findings gave the clearest message yet that non-compliance, particularly where passengers are concerned, can have extremely tragic results with high loss of life.

The effectiveness of Port State Control at the ports concerned with the Al-Salam Boccaccio 98 was also demonstrably lax and this is a trend so common in the Middle East, African and Asian regions. Moreover, such a scenario is all part of the polarisation of safety standards that regretfully exists between the first and third worlds and that has brought about the existence (by necessity) of the so-called 'white list' of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

The reasons for any disaster are often complex, but a tragedy is aggravated so much more when existing regulations are in place that might otherwise have prevented a particular disaster were it not for loopholes in legislation. In the case of the Egyptian Ferry the so-called 'Stockholm Agreement' of 1997 that brought about improvements in the construction of ro-ro ferries, post 2000, did not apply. These changes were brought about following the infamous Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia accidents in 1987 and 1994 respectively, yet were not applicable to older vessels. However, regulations did permit modifications to be carried out that increased the passenger capacity of the ferry to 1,400. This contradiction in safety ethos requires further examination since while the applicability of new regulations just to newer tonnage is understandable and reasonable, loopholes that facilitate (other) greater risks on exempt tonnage should be firmly closed.

Marine safety

Nearly two months after the Egyptian ferry sank, the floating restaurant Al Dana capsized in waters off Bahrain with the loss of 58 lives, and the question of marine safety was again big news. What occurred was certainly outside the remit of international maritime regulations, but the disaster emphasised again that compliance in whatever form is essential in order to safeguard human life. It transpired that the vessel was unlicensed to operate as a 'tour dhow and should have remained tied alongside. It subsequently became apparent that enforcement of regulations had been slack, including allowing more than the maximum capacity of persons to board the dhow.

In the case of such craft as the Al Dana, while local regulation requires inspection in all the Gulf states, no safety management system is compulsory and if there is an accident the question of responsibility and accountability can be evaded and bypassed as a result. Furthermore, the entrenchment of a safety culture is therefore seriously lacking despite the fact that customers are being enticed into a potentially more hazardous environment. As a solution, implementation of ISM could be considered to be an 'overkill' but some system is nevertheless required. This notwithstanding, at least one tour operator in Dubai - Danat Dubai Cruises - has implemented the ISM Code, and its largest vessel is properly classed and certificated, despite much-lesser statutory requirements when it does not engage in international voyages. However, many other operators do not entertain such systems and are blatantly flouting their 'duty of care' which (unfortunately, in this region) is just a moral requirement over and above a token inspection.

The unfortunate conclusion for these issues is that the potential for major marine accidents in the Gulf remains significant. The examples given cover just two areas where the public continue to be 'exposed' but they are exceedingly relevant with a significant number of ferries plying the Gulf.

Furthermore, regarding commercial shipping, the shipping industry in general is laced with minority of non-compliance that often hides under a veil of respectability. Thankfully, there is a majority of responsible operators that do take 'duty of care' seriously but the remainder are a cause for serious concern.

The clear-cut requirements for authorities, be they municipalities, port states or flag states, are abundantly obvious, although lethargy in acceptance remains worryingly evident. For instance, with the current 'explosion' of marine-related projects and businesses in this region, the enforcement of common-sense compliance seems to be seriously lagging behind the expansion. Moreover, it is precisely because of the existence of such an explosion and indeed, the previously mentioned loopholes in regulations, that authorities have an undoubted 'duty of care' to enforce stringency in all areas that are applicable. Furthermore, all other parties should be equally bound by the same ethos to ensure compliance.

In areas not governed by international conventions it is incumbent on local authorities to provide proper enforcement and this shall require proactive rather than reactive philosophies and policing.

- The writer is a Dubai-based Marine Consultant specialising in safety management, security and training.