Smell of war permeates the air in Kashmir

The smell of war is in the air. Like helpless actors the two countries of India and Pakistan are inexorably moving in the direction of a deadly conflict.

That deadly conflict is fuelled by hate and revenge as much as it is fuelled by a conflict that already triggered three wars in half a century.

Hate driven Kashmiri militants, camouflaged as Indian soldiers, mowed down women and children with guns and grenades in the disputed and blood-soaked valley of Kashmir. They wanted revenge and they took it.

They killed the wives and children of the Indian army soldiers deployed on the borders. The message was clear: if the militants could target Indian army families in their homes, the Indian soldiers at the Line of Control could hardly deter them.

Now hate and revenge fuels the soldiers who saw their wives, daughters and sons dead in blood soaked clothes. That hate fills their colleagues in the Indian military too. They want revenge. The pressure on Premier Vajpayee is to exact that revenge through military retaliation.

The chance of such a war was predicted by the American CIA chief in March. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, George Tenet stated, "If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack."

Two years back, American President Clinton described South Asia as the most dangerous place in the world.

And for the last six months, Indian and Pakistani soldiers have stood eyeball to eyeball at the line of control. That massive build up followed an attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi last December.

Now India has expelled Pakistan's High Commissioner. The Prime Minister and the Opposition united and Parlia-ment demanded firm action against the militants.

The drums of war are beating. The international community has high stakes in the region.

Pakistan is now a key ally of the US led forces in neighboring Afghanistan. The last situation the U S would like to see develop is the war against terror deflected by the war between India and Pakistan.

But if the militants wanted to deflect attention from the heat of allied forces against Al Qaida in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, they succeeded.

The fight that began in Kabul last September triggered by militants flying planes into the Twin Towers has every possibility of turning into a fight for Srinagar triggered by militants determined to provoke an Indo Pak clash.

A critical error by the international community was the conclusion that a military dictator could defuse tension between India and Pakistan or prevent the rise of the tidal wave of extremism which is now engulfing the region.

The second error by the international community was the inability to make a distinction between indigenous regional conflicts and terrorism. The Middle East flared up when Israeli Premier Sharon exploited changed global perceptions to invade the Palestinian Authority. Now India is in danger of doing the same. Indeed, the post September world is one more conducive to armed solutions than to political ones.

There is talk by Indian officials of limited military strikes to destroy training camps in Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Heavy exchanges of artillery fire are taking place across the line of control. Villagers in the villages near the Line of Control are leaving amid fears of a fourth Indo-Pakistan war.

It is a frightening scenario. Western capitals are hurriedly sending officials to the region in a fire-fighting bid.

Musharraf, the great white hope in the fight against terrorism, is sinking in a quicksand of his own making. His tenure was marked by the rise of extremism, militancy, terrorism and regional tension. He missed the opportunity at Agra in 2000 to sign a confidence building treaty with New Delhi.

He carries the baggage of being the architect of the Kargil conflict that nearly led to an Indo-Pak war in 1999. His lone ranger politics pits him against domestic political forces polarising the country. Given this history, it's unlikely that dialogue proposals can halt the inexorable march to war now taking place.

There is one way that the prospects of war can be prevented. That is regime change. Regime change in Islamabad offers the possibility of a fresh start. Such a regime change can come about by the officer corps of the Pakistan Army. In the absence of the elected Parliament, they are the law. They can ask Musharraf to make way and allow a new government to begin confidence building dialogue with a clean slate.

It has happened once before. In 1971, the senior officers of the Pakistan Army went to then military dictator General Yayha, who also wore the cap of Army chief, asking him to resign. Yahya did, facilitating the formation of a new government that picked up the pieces.

It signed the Simla Agreement in 1972 which held peace in place until both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices in 1998. Since 1998, the two countries have thrice come to the brink of war.

Reports indicate that the corps commanders do speak up. They initially opposed the holding of the controversial Referendum by which Musharraf sought to make himself Pakistan's President. They will debate a two front war at a time when their men are stretched, both at the eastern and western borders.

The view of Pakistan's important and powerful ally, America, is pivotal too. The White House was vocal in its support for General Musharaf. President Bush called him "my friend". Now it will have to choose between a man that is considered a friend and risking a limited war that could get out of hand.

New Delhi will reflect before starting a military action which lacks the support of the U S. But it enjoys far greater freedom of action than Islamabad had during the Kargil fighting. Then President Clinton could dictate to debt laden Islamabad held hostage by the IMF. President Bush might find it difficult to dictate to New Delhi. New Delhi's economy is largely independent.

Bush does have one weapon in his hand that can deter New Delhi. That is the threat of international mediation for the Kashmir cause. New Delhi is opposed to such internationalistan.

A military setback could cook Musharaf's goose. Far better for him and the region that he agrees to a regime change to prevent the start of armed hostilities that could trigger a nuclear nightmare.

And far better for New Delhi to accept such a regime change as face saving than allow a limited war that could spill out of control.

New Delhi could remember that Islamabad can do well in a war that is limited in area and time.

Its military is well equipped. A limited war could turn into a longer and larger war in the heat of a blazing summer with temperatures rising to fifty degrees centigrade in parts of both countries.

During his testimony before the Senate Committee last March, CIA director Tenet said the decision to turn Islamabad into an ally in the wake of the September 11 bombings was "a fundamental political shift with inherent risks."

Those risks