Controversial security law in Hong Kong

Before the peaceful transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China there were increasing fears that the people of Hong Kong would lose their freedoms, basic rights and all the success and prosperity achieved under the British rule.

There were even expectations that once the hand-over was completed, Beijing would push its tanks and Red Army to the streets of Hong Kong to arrest pro-democracy and human rights activists and could even impose a repressive regime similar to that existing on the Chinese mainland.

However, none of these fears materialised and the Chinese measures in the ensuing phase were fairly smooth. This was simply because the Chinese leaders were by far wiser than to get involved in policies and actions that would stir hostility from the international public opinion and that would give others the impression that they do not observe their undertakings, hence that could be a prelude for obstacles to be created for the return of the island of Macau to the Chinese sovereignty.

Nevertheless, today, five years after the return of Hong Kong to China, there are fears circulating once again among a wide group of the population because of a tough new security law proposed by the executive administration.

This law, which is expected to be easily endorsed by the island's legislative council as the latter is dominated by pro- Beijing figures and which is expected to come into effect as from July 2003, includes a package of articles outlawing treason, secession, sedition, subversion, and demonstration against China's ruling Communist Party.

Under the proposed legislation, the security authorities will have the right to search homes and offices without a warrant, detention of suspects, and imposing harsh penalties that could reach life imprisonment.

Of course, the justification given for the introduction of the above law is simply to "protect national security". This is a very loose expression that can be used against any activity that is not satisfactory to the ruling authority and can be exploited for any purpose in the non-democratic countries or those that do not have deep-rooted democracies.

The opponents of the new law, such as the executive director of the Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Committee, leaders of the April 5th Action Group and pro-democracy and human rights activists, do not see any immediate justifications for this legislation. They claim that since the return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, their island has not witnessed a single incident that bears a threat to the mainland's sovereignty or national unity.

According to them, what is available to the Hong Kong government (such as the sweeping police powers inherited from the colonial British, the Basic Law whereby the island was handed over to China, and provisions of Hong Kong's mini constitution that gives the local courts the powers to deal with any security issue) is more than enough and there is no need for other laws that would eradicate Hong Kong's special status.

Meanwhile, journalists say that the enforcement of the new law will definitely curb the freedom of expression, hence the island's role as an international media centre will be damaged. Under the proposed law, the expression of views is allowed unless it intends to incite others to do something that will threaten national security.

Observers believe that the above law could give cover to the island's authorities to ban critics of Beijing and opponent political organizations like the Falun Gong spiritual movement and the Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movement in China.

Falun Gong has been on the run for several years in the Chinese mainland and enjoys strong support in Hong Kong where it is active, while the second group has been labelled by Beijing as subversive.

However, Beijing and its supporters in Hong Kong have another opinion. When the head of the executive authority Tung Chee-hwa presented the new draft law to the legislature for discussion over the next three months, he followed his action by a media campaign designed to achieve two goals.

The first goal was to reassure that the fears expressed were exaggerated and that human rights and civil liberties were the basic pillars of Hong Kong's prosperity, hence it would be ridiculous to sacrifice them.

The second goal was to convince people that his action was similar to the action taken by democratic regimes in the west to protect national security.

When faced with objections about the loose terms used for justifying the introduction of the new law and that it was easy to consider any peaceful activity ( such as demanding a broader scope of democracy and not to yield to Beijing's dictates ) as a threat to national security, Chee-hwa's response was "the local courts decide whether or not a certain activity constitutes acts that threaten national security".

But who can really say that the powers of the Hong Kong courts in this respect are clear and precise?

According to the Basic Law, such courts do not have the power to express an opinion in respect of issues related to defence and foreign relations. Such courts are obliged in the event of disagreement over legal interpretations or applicability of a particular law to refer to the local parliament which is a rubber stamp in Beijing's pocket.

Further, Beijing can override all Hong Kong laws and freeze the role of the local courts if China at war or if turmoil in the island is considered a threat to national security.

The question that must be asked is why has China waited for five years to propose this security law? Are there new circumstances that have not existed previously prompting China to speed up its decision?

It can be said that China has waited until sights are no longer focused on its administration of Hong Kong and extent of its implementation of its undertakings stipulated in the Sovereignty Transfer Agreement with Britain.

Of course, the present time is the most ideal opportunity for implementing what China insisted on in 1990 when it said that Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law must contain its right to activate broader security laws in order to prevent the use of the island as a base for provocation against the central government in Beijing.

The focus is now on the current developments in Afghanistan, plans and designs against Iraq with little or no attention being paid to what is going on elsewhere. This is not to speak about the keen desire of Washington and its allies to win over Beijing on their side in the UN Security Council, which implies turning a blind eye to any Chinese domestic action.

In addition, the September 11 events and the US war against terrorism, the new security measures that have taken place in the western democracies and sacrificing certain human rights criteria in order to enhance national security, have given Beijing the trump card to do the same thing in Hong Kong and under the same justification.

However, one can easily argue here that if the card of protecting national security against foreign threats as the means of restricting certain freedoms was authorized in democratic nations after discussions and voting in the ful