The Algerian presidential elections, which were held on Thursday, will almost certainly lead to the re-election of the incumbent president, Abdul Aziz Bouteflika. Just like the 1999 elections, the vote will be a victory for neither democracy nor Algeria.
If this type of quasi-democratic process shows anything, it is that the ruling secular elites in the Arab world have been a great deal more reluctant to democratise, or even liberalise, than had been initially anticipated. The authoritarian leanings of Arab secular regimes are the outcome of a protracted legitimacy crisis. Arab leaders of the populist variety claim a popular mandate to rule. Yet, they cannot hold free elections or allow their people a voice in the conduct of government because this could lead them to surrender their prerogatives, or all the power that goes with them. To find a way out of this impasse, some Arab rulers, such as Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, have claimed, without holding elections, that they serve the general will. Others have tried to accommodate domestic and international demands for more political openness by holding a single-candidate presidential referendum. When some were forced to hold multi-candidate elections, they very often rigged them. In any instance, Arab rulers have been rarely so bold as to hold free elections, which may rob them of the very legitimacy they claim to possess.
This latter inclination has been virtually demonstrated by yesterday's Algerian presidential elections, which marked another major setback in the efforts to create a true democracy in the Arab world. In the absence of genuine political pluralism, Algeria's general elections could never have taken a different route. Bouteflika used almost all the resources under his disposal to secure a third five-year term in office. Preparations for a landslide victory for the incumbent president started as early as November 3, 2008, when Bouteflika announced that a planned constitutional revision would remove the two-term limit on the presidency that was previously included in Article 74, thereby enabling him to run for a third term. The People's National Assembly endorsed the removal of the term limit two weeks later; only a handful of deputies voted against the amendment.
Bouteflika chose not to repeat the scenario of 1999, when the key opposition parties were forced to pull out at the last minute. He, instead, made it difficult for many to run. Eighteen candidates expressed interest, but only six met the legal requirements. Even opposition parties that participated in the rubber-stamp parliament boycotted the elections on the grounds that it would only legitimise Bouteflika's 'constitutional coup'. In this way, the election was also different from 2004, in that there was no reasonably 'strong' candidate with real personal or ideological differences from Bouteflika. Regardless, the president could say that he allowed multi-candidate elections, though accepting the challenge of lightweight rivals.
It is not only that Bouteflika has accepted challengers from tiny legal parties, whose performance was very much in doubt, but he has also denied them the right to compete in a free and fair environment. Other runners did not have, for example, the opportunity to go on television or on radio for even one minute; whereas Bouteflika's portrait was on display in almost every shop and public building in Algiers, with his picture on the front pages of all the major daily newspapers. Hence, few Algerians knew who was running for president, apart from Bouteflika.
Finally, the major Islamic opposition group, the National Salvation Front (FIS), was denied the right to participate in the elections. FIS was outlawed in 1992 and its leaders were either jailed or deported. No wonder the elections did not promise any real change.
Despite all this, we expect the Algerian government to consider the elections as a great leap towards democracy. This claim, if made, will not come as a surprise. The real surprise will be, however, if the Western powers; mainly the US and France, agree with the judgment of the Algerian government. As the results of the Algerian elections are announced, many expect to hear some sort of protest from the capitals of the two greatest democracies of the Western world. To the disappointment of many, nothing of that will likely be heard.
Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations at Damascus University's Faculty of Political Science and Media.
