'Korea model' won't work in Iraq

Five years after the war for Iraq, and this seems to be the most appropriate moniker for what is officially known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, concrete plans are being drawn to keep American troops in Iraq on a more or less permanent basis. Will such a presence protect the United States or damage its tarnished image in the Middle East?

Speaking for President George W. Bush, Tony Snow, the official White House spokesman, declared last week that the Republic of Korea (or South Korea) was one of the models under evaluation to think of Washington's long-term mission in Iraq. This option presumably embraced an "over-the-horizon support role", to assist local and regional allies, after American forces were no longer needed to patrol city streets. In other words, troops would be garrisoned at several bases, and called upon to engage threats if and when any emerged.

If this paradigm is adopted, American troops will be in Iraq for decades to come, with serious consequences for all regional actors. The "Korea model" also means that the presence in Iraq will be large. In fact, Washington is likely to draw down from its Summer 2007 figure (approximately 160,000 soldiers), but not by much. Substantial numbers will be required to staff three or four bases, including one or more of the following: Al Balad, Al Asaad, Bashur, H1 and Talil. Thousands of troops would be deployed on a rotating basis much like on the Korean Peninsula.

What optimists are contemplating is that these bases would allow for trouble free flights in and out of Iraq "without putting Americans on every street corner". According to a senior official deeply involved in the development of strategy for the country, "our mission would be very different - making sure that Al Qaida doesn't turn Iraq into a base the way it turned Afghanistan into one."

Fractured society

Critics retort that Iraq already is an Al Qaida training ground and that it is no Korea because of its multi-ethnic and religious composition. They point out that Korea has had no internal insurgency to worry about and that the fractured Iraqi society harboured a potential for severe violence, well into the future.

Beyond updating four large bases along with a gigantic new embassy in the Green Zone (how long will it remain green?), it is intriguing to ask when these initiatives were first conceived, and to what end.

In fact, plans for permanent bases in Iraq were long in the making, because various cautionary notes about precisely such ideas floated from time to time. For example, one of the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, called on Washington to declare that the United States did not seek permanent bases in Iraq.

In 2006, both the Senate and House passed an amendment to the military-spending bill, which explicitly banned the establishment of permanent bases.

Although the amendment was quietly dropped when the bill went to conference before both chambers adopted it, the mere fact that such measures surfaced, indicated high-level discussions about them for some time.

General Anthony Zinni, the retired officer who led Central Command for several years, concluded that permanent bases in Iraq were "a stupid idea". Even former president Jimmy Carter, who was part of the establishment save for periodic bursts of candour, concluded in February 2006, "the reason we went into Iraq was to establish a permanent military base in the Gulf region."

Stupid or not, mammoth facilities are intended for more than Iraqi stabilisation, public rhetoric notwithstanding. Indeed, few observers miss the point that a significant American military presence in Iraq will chiefly deter Iran from contemplated hegemony in the Gulf region.

The question raised at the top of this essay is therefore existential. Actually, no military power can protect itself by solely relying on an arsenal of death and destruction, especially as the twenty-first century will slowly alter basic power relationships among nations. That is not to say that raw power would be outlawed but that military institutions will gradually fall back on purely defensive postures. Moreover, what is likely to emerge are economic capabilities that will remove protectionist barriers, coupled with staunch cultural strengths to help define how people interacted with each other.

The Korean analogy is thus revealing for its innocence, assuming that a democracy, raucous as it may be, can be duplicated in Baghdad through force. Even if democratisation was not an initial objective for Iraq, and it was not, its worthy potential is easier fathomed than applied.

Permanent

Undoubtedly, a permanent presence will allow Washington to take military action against Iran if the latter decided to use putative nuclear capabilities, while keeping an eye over the oil resources it desperately craves. Arab Gulf States must therefore come to terms with Iran as well as the metaphysical certitude hovering around designs over their oil. Both are fraught with serious dangers.

It is for such reasons, along with unforeseen consequences, that a permanent military presence in Iraq will regrettably transform the American image.

While it is necessary to defend against terrorism, preserving one's traditional values - as a beacon of freedom - is wiser, and worthier. It would be tragic if the United States were to become a mundane colonial entity. Most of its citizens, and the millions who live in the Gulf, frown on that notion.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.