Is India crossing the Rubicon?

Not many recent international agreements have been debated as intensely all over the world as the so-called Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Generally known as Agreement 123, it represents a bold departure from the non-proliferation policy that the United States has hitherto implemented though the US administration has consistently tried to pacify its irate non-proliferation lobby by arguing that Agreement 123 would, in fact, bring some of the Indian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This was always a weak argument and the debate has continued unabated despite strong support in the US Congress for this new nuclear relationship with India.

Prominent amongst the various circles in which arguments have raged are the forums that consider the agreement as a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regimes. The Indian political class that got polarised about Agreement 123's implications for national sovereignty and the freedom to pursue India's nuclear programme - civil and military alike - without any externally imposed constraints, and last but not the least, the fear in neighbouring states such as Pakistan that it may intensify an arms race.

The overarching argument that periodically interlocked the different circles of these conversations was what was universally seen to be a deliberate decision of the Bush administration to assist India in emerging as a world power aligned to Washington's own strategic design for the 21st century. In an oversimplified version, the objective was often stated as building India into a counter-weight to China and, simultaneously, casting India as the pre-eminent regional power to which the United States would "outsource" some of its burdens.

By far, the most intense debate took place in India itself, the main beneficiary of the agreement. On the face of it, it was a win-win situation for India. The agreement would end the ambiguity about India's nuclear status and concede its rightful place in the international nuclear pantheon.

The agreement ran into squalls of bitter opposition in India both within parliament and outside it. Two considerations stood out amongst the objections. First, it was fiercely argued that Agreement 123 would curtail Indian sovereignty and reduce its independence in conducting its foreign and security policy. Secondly, India would not henceforth be free when it came to testing advanced nuclear weapons. These reservations were shared by many politically neutral Indian scientists. Each clause, said the scientist Placid Rodriguez, is an affront to the self-respect and sovereignty of India. A Gopalakrishnan, a highly respected scientist, asked how India could get energy security if reactor fuel was sanctioned for only, say, two years at a time.

At the political plane the main tussle took place in India's ruling United Progressive Alliance. The four-party Left that kept Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's minority government led by the Congress party in power disagreed sharply. Apart from the arguments mentioned above, the Left also periodically invoked a more doctrinaire world view to oppose the deal. Singh, however, rightly calculated that no major party wanted to force an early election in India.

Patience

Except on the eve of the just concluded G8 summit in Japan, Singh showed remarkable patience in the protracted negotiations with allies and political foes even if there was no meeting of minds. In the end Singh was up against an urgent time line compressed by the closure of the Bush era. If India missed the end-July session of IAEA, it would have to wait for the next session in September. Since the consent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, though a foregone conclusion, would be required before the US Congress sent up the Bill to President George W. Bush for his formal approval, Singh had no option but to challenge the Left to leave the coalition but not obstruct his hard-pressed time table.

The Left has withdrawn its support but the government is poised to win the confidence vote narrowly on July 21-22 with the unexpected help of the 39-member Samajwadi Party and some independent members of the Lower House of parliament.

On its part, the G8 summit has extended instant 'robust" support for the Indian decision to go head with 123 by dovetailing it with the G8 resolve to help India overcome its current energy crunch.

For Pakistan the basic text is what Siddharth Varadarajan, the astute deputy editor of The Hindu wrote on the new "Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship" as far back as July 2005. He said that "Pakistan may still be the United States' major non-Nato ally in South Asia but India was being cultivated as its lever for realising a more fundamental goal: to remain firmly embedded in Asia at a time when the continent was emerging as the world's new centre of gravity and Beijing as Washington's challenger nonpareil".

This was before Bush came to the region and formally declared that American policies in South Asia would not henceforth be 'hyphenated' between India and Pakistan. On the civil nuclear issue he had declined to include Pakistan arguing that the histories of the two countries were different. This disparity is bound to create waves in the region and influence the India-Pakistan dialogue in the months ahead. We will turn to that dimension another time.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan. He currently heads the institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.