Fear is behind Russia's move

Having raised the temperature in the Caucasus by several degrees, Russian forces have now left their last positions inside Georgia proper. Some Russian units continue to be present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two ethnic minority enclaves that are legally part of Georgia but effectively controlled by a secessionist group.

So, does this mean the start of a new Cold War with its first dividing line taking shape in what was until recently a geopolitical backwater?

Advocates of the new Cold War claim that a resurgent, self-confident and immensely richer Russia is determined to cast itself in the role of leader for a bloc of nations determined to challenge the Western power bloc led by the United States.
If that analysis is correct, the world should be moving towards a new division into rival blocs, accompanied by a new arms race and a series of proxy wars.

A closer examination, however, would show that what we are witnessing is not a new Cold War but a re-run of 19th century big power rivalries. Today's Russia is behaving more like the Russia of the 1880s than the Soviet Union of the 1950s. It wants to be recognised as a big boy, respected and admired, if not feared, and offered something more than a stool at the banquet of great powers.

The Cold War was based on two diametrically opposed perceptions of human existence and two rival models of society. The USSR wanted to conquer the world in the name of communism, while the United States pursued the same goal in the name of democracy and capitalism. The two sides regarded each other as enemies, not mere rivals, competitors and adversaries. Nikita Khrushchev publicly promised to bury the Western powers. And US defence secretary Robert McNamara devised "overkill" plans against the Soviets.

Today, the situation is different.

Russia, even under Vladimir Putin's jingoistic leadership, does not offer a rival model of society and an original vision of human existence. It has adopted the capitalist system, albeit in the style that Bismarck developed in 19th century Prussia. Today's Russia is not a one-party system, even though the Putin clan holds and exercises the bulk of political power. There are no gulags, and no cloud of fear hanging over every Russian village and town.
Russia is crying out for attention as would an adolescent, discovering his new strength. The Western powers, notably the United States, should treat Russia as a competitor or rival, or, at worst, an adversary, not as an enemy.

Anyone familiar with current thinking in Russia would know that the Russian elite regards a strategic partnership with the West as the best option for the country. Despite recent controversial moves to control, bully or even defraud a number of Western companies that have invested in Russia, there is no evidence that the Kremlin wants to close the country to foreign investment. Nor is there evidence that Russia, heavily dependent on imports for almost everything except oil, gas and weapons, would want to deny foreign producers access to its markets. Moreover, the Iron Curtain is gone with millions of Russian citizens travelling, studying and investing in the West, and rejecting any attempt at dividing the continent in the context of a new Cold War.

Argument

Much is made of the fact that Europe now heavily depends on Russia for imports of gas and oil. A good part of those imports come from Russian fields. But a substantial part also comes from Central Asian countries and the Caspian Basin, with Russia offering pipeline facilities. Advocates of the "new Cold War" theory claim that such arrangements give Russia the possibility to hold Europe to ransom. The argument is that Russia could blackmail the European powers by brandishing the energy arm, thus forcing them to toe the line it draws.

However, that argument ignores the fact that Russia owes almost all of its new power to those energy exports to Europe. If it halts supplies, it would also cut its own principal source of income. In other words, Russia is as much dependent on Europe as Europe is on Russia. And it is precisely such interdependence that renders a new Cold War impossible.

Under Stalin, Russia was able to enter into a Cold War because it had developed a doctrine of self-sufficiency. It could shut itself from the outside world and survive, even if that meant great material hardship. The Cold War became increasingly meaningless, as the Soviet Union, under Stalin's successors, grew dependent on Western imports and investments. At one point, in the so-called détente era, the USSR practically survived on what amounted to Western subsidies.

Today, Russia can pay its own way and requires no subsidies. However, it cannot sustain its economic growth without expanding commercial relations with the West. This is why no Russian politician, apart perhaps from the deranged Valdimir Zhirinovsky, would regard the West as enemy. What the Russian political elite is aiming at is greater competition with the West for influence and prestige.

Competition and rivalry could be as productive in international affairs as it is in the market place. The world is big enough to provide space for many nations to compete against one another. The only danger comes when, and if, a competitor allies itself to an enemy of its rival powers in order to score tactical gains. So far, Russia has not done so. It has resisted the temptation of siding with mavericks such as the Islamic Republic in Iran or the Hugo Chavez regime in Venezuela that regard themselves as enemies of the United States. Nor is there evidence that Russia is engaged in a systematic scheme of propping up anti-Western regimes across the globe, as was the case in the Cold War.

Contrary to what some commentators suggest, Russia's invasion of Georgia, partly prompted by Georgian President Mikheil Sakaachvili's childish behaviour, was a sign of nervousness rather than overconfidence. Putin is trying to build an authoritarian version of the capitalist system, as did France under Louis Bonaparte, Prussia under Bismarck, Japan under the Meiji, and Argentina under Juan Peron. Such a system is bound to feel threatened by the emergence of liberal democratic societies on its peripheries.

The fear that the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and the Revolution of the Roses in Georgia could be repeated in Russia has haunted Putin for years. He has decided to strike because he is afraid.

He needs to be reassured and convinced that as long as Russia respects the basic rules of the game it could have its proper place in the post-Cold War world.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.