End of Bush era leads to reconciliation

Syrian Prime Minister Naji Al Otari, accompanied by a high-level delegation, paid an important visit to Baghdad this week. Al Otari was the highest-ranking Syrian official to visit Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. The visit was regarded by both sides as a milestone in the relationship between the two longtime rivals in the Arab world. The timing of the visit was also significant and it received extensive media coverage because it represented a strategic shift in regional politics.

For 50 years, at least since the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, Syrian-Iraqi relations have been fraught with fear and suspicion. Relations have been particularly testy while Iraq has been under US occupation, with the new Iraqi regime persistently accusing Syria of trying to undermine its power and legitimacy.

Since day one of the US invasion, Syria had hoped that Washington would not win the war against Iraq and was struggling to deal with the idea of the US becoming a major player in the Middle East. Syria's position was not in fact based on any sort of sympathy with the former regime of Saddam Hussain. It was rather determined by pragmatic provisions directly related to its security dilemma.

For more than three decades, relations between the two wings of the ruling Baath party in Damascus and Baghdad have been shaped by mistrust.

The two countries had been involved in numerous attempts to undermine each other. Syria also supported Iran in the eight-year war against Iraq, whereas Iraq backed the Lebanese anti-Syrian government of General Michel Aoun.

One feature the two regimes had in common, however, was pragmatism. As a result, from around 1997 Syria and Iraq came to see one another as possible allies. The late Syrian president Hafez Al Assad started cautiously, but steadily, developing relations with his lifelong enemy, Saddam. The ascendance of Al Assad's son, Bashar, to power hastened this process as the new president lacked the personal animosity which marked the relationship between Saddam and his father.

In the following years, Syria tried to develop its political and economic ties with Iraq - but was careful not to provoke the US. The September 11 attacks provided Syria with a 'strategic oppo rtunity'. Damascus supplied Washington with valuable information about militants and in return Washington turned a blind eye to the smuggling of Iraqi oil through Syria. This tacit understanding did not last long, however, as the Taliban regime crumbled quickly and Iraq became the focus of US policy in the region.

From a political and strategic perspective, Syria was almost certain that the war against Iraq was fought by the US on behalf of Israel. This argument cannot be easily dismissed, taking into account the fact that the war was advocated by Israel's friends in Washington. In a region that is still very much dominated by a realpolitik approach and a delicate balance of power, Syria feared that a US-backed government in Baghdad would almost certainly place it in between two hostile powers: Israel and a pro-US Iraq. Syria was also concerned about the possible disintegration of Iraq and the likelihood of this affecting its own Kurdish minority. In addition, the war was seen in Damascus as an attempt to reshape the political map of the region in a way that suited both Israel and the US.

Economically, Syria was benefiting from profitable economic relations with Saddam's Iraq. From October 2000 until the US invasion, Syria received 200,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day at a low price. This amount of oil allowed Syria to increase its share in the oil market and generate $2 billion (Dh7.34 billion) annually of much needed hard currency. The advent of an unfriendly regime in Iraq deprived Syria of this important economic privilege at a time when it was most needed.

Under the Bush administration, Syria felt that there was little incentive to pursue a different foreign policy approach towards Iraq. Whatever steps it had taken, for example efforts to secure its borders with Iraq, had been barely acknowledged by Washington. Moreover, developments in the region - Hamas' victory in Palestine, US troubles in Iraq, Iran's confrontational stance vis-à-vis the West, and Hezbollah's victory over Israel during the July 2006 war - appeared to be bolstering Syria's position against US pressure.

Under such conditions, Syria's approach focused mainly on playing for time and weathering the storm until the end of George W. Bush's presidency. Bush has now gone and the region seems to have entered into a more relaxed phase. Since he took office in January, US President Barack Obama has sent several positive signals towards Syria. Damascus has responded in a likewise manner.

Iraq is now regarded as one of the key foreign policy issues on which co-operation between the two sides is both possible andmutually beneficial. The changing of the guard in Washington has affected the way many countries relate to one another and Syrian-Iraqi relations are no exception.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a lecturer in Media and International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.