Dividing the Palestinians

The first likely consequence of the recent violent takeover of Gaza by Hamas's military wing is that divided, the Palestinians place themselves in a weaker position vis-a-vis an enemy increasingly more expansionist.

The prospect of two separate Palestinian entities only strengthens Israel's strategy of creating facts on the ground that deepens the cantonisation of Palestine into separate and divided entities unable to form a viable and independent Palestinian state.

Secondly, the resort to force plays into the hands of those who never reconciled themselves to accepting Hamas as a legitimate interlocutor for peace negotiations.

It also calls into question the ability of Hamas's political leadership, enhanced by the recent agreement brokered by Saudi Arabia in Makkah for the formation of a national unity government, to assert its authority on its military wing.

Third, by resorting to force, Hamas militants made the serious mistake of exchanging the legitimacy of their claim to power, namely the Palestinian people who gave them a sweeping electoral victory in January 2006, for the unedifying and unstable foundation of power achieved and maintained by force.

Israeli leaders continue to mistakenly believe that it is in the best interest of their expansionist strategy to have the Palestinian people divided, ideologically, politically, and geographically.

But a Gaza strip sealed by the Israelis and in which Palestinians live virtually like prisoners, and ruled by a radicalised, angry and frustrated people, cannot be in the best long term interest of Israel. Nor can it be in the best interest of other major players in the region.

It must be said, however, that Hamas is not the only guilty party here. Hamas arguably was being provoked by Fatah officials who were reluctant to turn over to Hamas the reins of power.

Hamas militants could see that the flood of weapons to the security forces of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, had only one obvious aim: To confront Hamas militants and rout them out, thus leaving the political wing of Hamas without military leverage in any eventual constitutional showdown or even constitutional coup.

Reprehensible provocation

The most reprehensible provocation, however, came from the refusal of Israel and the US to recognise the legitimacy of Hamas's electoral landslide victory in January 2006.

Shortly after Hamas's victory, the Bush administration and Israel launched a campaign to undermine Hamas's hold on power, by cutting funds, isolating it politically and by openly supporting military aid to those whose authority had just been rejected by the Palestinian people.

It was an astonishing display of hypocrisy from those who wax righteous about the need to respect democracy and the sanctity of human rights.

The New York Times, not exactly a radical publication, could not ignore the blatant hypocrisy. "Is it really possible," wrote the editors, "to expect that more punishment from the Israelis and the Americans, this time for not voting the way we wanted them to, would lead [the Palestinians] to abandon Hamas?".

Former US president Jimmy Carter recently said that the Bush administration's refusal to accept Hamas's 2006 election victory was "criminal".

But it would be naïve and shortsighted to refuse to see that the most blatant provocations have come from Israeli leaders who, while claiming to eagerly desire peace with the Palestinians, have been actively working, with Washington's support, to block it.

The whole Israeli approach to the conflict has been to deny Palestinian rights not only in political platforms but in actual dispossessing of the Palestinian people and marginalisation of their leaders.

Thus, when the Palestine Liberation Organisation emerged as the spokesperson of the Palestinian people and was recognised as such by much of the international community in 1974, Israeli leaders sought to cultivate local Palestinian leaders willing to cooperate with the occupiers.

Most Palestinians supported, not the collaborators, but the PLO. Israeli leaders then sought to cultivate Hamas to challenge and undermine the PLO's authority.

When the PLO, challenged by Palestinian children who revolted against the occupation, accepted the two-state solution and thus indirectly recognised Israel in 1988, without getting much in return, Israeli leaders saw an opportunity to exact more concessions. They accepted the PLO and Arafat as "partners for peace".

But Israeli vision of peace was based not on equality but on one party dominating the other. And thus through various "peace" agreements such as Oslo in 1993 to accepted "peace" processes such as the 2004 roadmap, the colonisation of Palestinian territories never stopped, the attempts at decimating Palestinian society never abated.

Losing more land

After 13 years of Oslo and two years of roadmap "peace" process, the Palestinians found they were losing more land, suffering more punishment and violations of rights, being separated from families, farms and schools by a wall of apartheid. In short, they were further than ever from a just peace that gives them freedom and independence in their own country.

They held not just the Israelis but also their own leadership responsible for this state of affairs. And this was largely the message of the January 2006 electoral landslide victory of Hamas. And this is what American and Israeli leaders do not want to accept.

The Palestine authority needs to re-examine its open-ended commitment to a "peace" process that has in reality rendered the prospect of a just and lasting peace more elusive than ever. They need to honestly analyse why the Palestinian people rejected their leadership.

Finally, both Hamas and the Fatah need to agree that the Palestinian people's interest lies in confronting their common enemy in defence of their legitimate rights, not in confronting each other.

Prof. Adel Safty is author of 'From Camp David to the Gulf'.