Base of France's foreign policy

If all goes well, a small military base some 5,000 kilometres from Paris will soon enter French history for a number of reasons.

The base, expected to be located in the Arabian Peninsula, will be the first that France has opened outside its national territory since the late 1960s. It will also be the very first permanent French military presence close to the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

The last time the French had such a presence in the region was in the 1800s when General Gardanne headed a military mission to the court of the Qajar shahs of Iran.

At a time that many in the West regard the maintaining of any bases as a grievous sin, the prospect of a mid-ranking Western European power embarking on such a scheme might seem bizarre, to say the least.

What is remarkable, however, is that President Nicolas Sarkozy's announcement concerning the base has provoked little debate and almost no negative reaction in France.

Even the caviar-and-champagne left that misses no opportunity to denounce the bases that the US might set up anywhere in the world, has greeted the news of the new French base with cynical silence.

In military terms, the planned base is unlikely to alter the balance of power in a region that accounts for a quarter of the world's oil production and will serve as an advanced observation post against "hostile powers" that might pose a threat to France's regional allies.

Reality

The decision to set up a base is, in a sense, an attempt at regularising a de facto reality. Since the Gulf War in 1991-92 France has always maintained hundreds of military personnel in the region.

These have been housed either in US bases or in military installations maintained by France's local partners. The French navy has been a regular visitor to the Gulf since the late 1960s and French arms sales to the region date back to the 1950s.

As always in such cases, the real importance of Sarkozy's decision is political. The proposed base provides the latest sign of Sarkozy's determination to reshape French foreign policy.

The way it has taken shape in the past eight months, Sarkozy's foreign policy appears to be based on the assumption that it is no longer possible to hide behind anti-American gesticulations.

For the past half a century, successive French governments, with one or two exceptions, have tried to portray France as a major player on the international scene by pulling face at Washington.

General Charles De Gaulle asked the US to close its bases on French territory, which the Americans promptly did, and then withdrew France from the military part of he North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato).

These moves had little or no effect on the bigger balance of power in Europe. Nor did they affect the basic issues of the Cold War. But they helped the French feel good about themselves.

De Gaulle knew that whether or not there were US bases on French territory and whether or not France was part of the Nato's military structures, the Americans would never let the Soviets drive their tanks into Paris.

De Gaulle's two immediate successors as president continued his policy by pursuing an illusory triangle in which Paris was half way between Washington and Moscow.

Under President Francois Mitterrand, a Socialist, France toned down its anti-Americanism and strongly supported Washington, first in President Ronald Reagan's decision to counter the Soviet missile build up in Europe, and then by joining President George Bush in flushing Saddam Hussain out of Kuwait.

After 1995, Mitterrand's successor, the neo-Gaullist Jacques Chirac, revived the anti-American gesticulations in their crudest form.

Having carefully studied the experiences of De Gaulle, Mitterrand and Chirac, Sarkozy is trying to develop a policy that reflects today's realities and tomorrow's dangers.

Sarkozy's three major predecessors started with the assumption that, when it came to any major international issue, the US was either the problem or the solution. Sarkozy starts with a quite different assumption.

He starts the analysis of every issue with the assumption that the US is not involved, either as a problem or as a solution. Imagine, there is no US, he asks, are the European nations threatened by radical Islamism or not?

Imagine there is no US, does the European Union depend on oil and gas imports from the Greater Middle East? Imagine there is no US, is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Khomeinist regime in Tehran good or bad for France and the European Union? Imagine there is no US, isn't Europe safer if Afghanistan and Iraq are transformed into friendly democracies rather than a safe haven for terrorists?

Vital importance

Having established the fact that an issue is of vital importance to France and the EU even if Christopher Columbus had not discovered America, Sarkozy then proceeds to ask another question.

Regardless of whatever anyone else might say or do, what is it that France and the EU can do to protect and further their own interests on any issue?

It is only after he has established a practical framework for whatever France and/or the EU might be able to do that Sarkozy proceeds to ask his third question: how can we harmonise policy with the United States which, as a major democracy and a global leader, is our strategic ally?

What one might call the Sarkozy method may reveal areas of difference between the EU and the United States. But on most major issues, it will show that the broadest interests of the Western democracies always coincide.

All this means that Sarkozy does not wish to define French policy in systematic opposition to the US. Nor des he want to keep French policy in suspension until the US, whose domestic political system makes decision-making on foreign policy difficult and at times even unpredictable, has come out with a clear position.

It is too early to tell whether or not Sarkozy's method will work. Sarkozy railroaded the new European Union treaty into agreement at governmental level without waiting for Washington to come out with a clear position.

He has taken the initiative on Darfur, again without waiting for the Americans to sort out their ambiguities on the issue. While Washington is still ambivalent about how far to accommodate the Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Sarkozy has unrolled the red carpet for him in Paris.

While Democrats in the US Congress calculate the number of votes and/or campaign contributions they might gain or lose by offering nuclear technology to allies in the Greater Middle East, Sarkozy has signed nuclear agreements with half a dozen of them.

Even on Iran, Sarkozy has come out with a range of punitive measures against the Islamic Republic going beyond the sanctions already decided by the United Nations' Security Council.

Sarkozy is no Chirac. But he is no Mitterrand either. He seems determined to avoid their mistakes. But he is sure to make some of his own.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.