Mavericks take on the mighty

Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, the authors of the controversial book, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, were at the Dubai School of Government recently to deliver a lecture.

The event was held as part of the School's growing programme of activities, including a distinguished lecture series, which is increasingly bringing influential figures in public policy from around the world to speak in Dubai.

The book, published in August 2007, is deemed controversial as it argues against the mainstream notion in the United States that America's relationship with Israel is a strategic one.

Important questions are put forward and a strong case is made that while Israel is not necessarily a strategic ally (more of a liability than an asset), the US still supports it out of purely domestic reasons (interest groups in the form of the Israeli lobby).

Walt and Mearsheimer are prominent political scientists with impeccable credentials: Walt is professor of international affairs at Harvard University and Mearsheimer is political science professor at the University of Chicago.

Both thinkers were sharp in their responses as they discussed US-Middle East relations and the Israeli-American alliance.

They spoke about the present political scene and the future of the region as well as the background to writing their book.

Excerpts:

Both of you are quite removed from the region (you don't have Middle Eastern backgrounds). Had it been someone from the region, things could have turned out differently as far as writing this book is concerned. Considering this, do you think you've had it easy?

I think having the name John [Mearsheimer] and my background made it much easier for me to write this than, say, someone such as my colleague, University of Chicago professor at the time, Rashid Khalidi, who is a Palestinian American.

One of the reasons why this book has had its impact is we don't have any connection. We are not immediately dismissible as those who are writing from a partisan point of view.

We were two very centred, middle-of-the-road, mainstream figures. For two establishment people (not Noam Chomsky, not Edward Said, not Norman Finklestein) to write this, people paid attention.

I [Stephen Walt] don't want to toot our own horn but in some respects, the ferocity of the response to our work was because we were ultimately more dangerous — in part because our backgrounds didn't make it easy [for people] to dismiss us or marginalise us.

We happened to have clearly stated over time that we are realists who believe in the utility of military force so it's well understood that we are not Left wingers or liberals.

The US-Israeli relationship has been described in many terms. Define it yourself.

It is a special relationship and a unique one, where the world's most powerful country by and large gives this country [Israel] nearly unconditional support.

We [America] back it economically, militarily and diplomatically and American politicians almost never say one critical word. That's very unusual.

Then the questions — Is it because it's strategic? A democracy? American people's demand?

No, it's domestic politics — in particular, the political act of these other strong interest groups in the US. It's a manufactured relationship.

Would you agree that no Arab-American interest group (or another Israeli lobby for that matter) will ever reach the flawless level of influence American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) enjoys?

Arab-American groups have been no match for the Israel lobby. But that situation is beginning to change, as Arab-Americans assimilate into US society, become more successful and begin to engage more vigorously in our political process.

However, they still have a long way to go before they can match the most powerful pro-Israel groups.

The “David and Goliath legend'' or the so-called religious affiliation and sentimentality among Christian Americans and the Jews of Israel appealed to many Americans, implying a portrayal of Israel as the weaker party.

Do you think this is starting to change in the Western world today?

There is a rather weak case here. Relations between Christians and Jews, including that in the US, were not all that great until after the Second World War.

Second, if you look at the mainstream protestant churches in the US, they've actually become critical of Israel in recent years on human rights grounds and other issues.

So the idea that we have the Old Testament in common is not a sufficient explanation for why the US gives Israel this much support.

But is it a common perception in the US that Americans identify more with Israel?

At an elite level, there has been a perception for a long time (post-1948) that the Israelis are our guys and they're like us, talk like us, [and are] educated in the US. And the Arabs, on the other hand, were more exotic and different.

Certainly, post-9/11 there has been a perception that Arabs are hostile and dangerous, and there is a clash of civilisations and this has been encouraged by key organisations in the lobby.

It's very important to understand that the hostility towards the Arab and Islamic world in the US is not unequivocal. The US and Israel have good relations with Egypt and Jordan.

During the Cold War, Israel chose to ally itself with the US whereas much of the Arab world chose to ally with the erstwhile USSR. Does this help explain the nature of the relationship?

Yes. Israeli leaders such as David Ben-Gurion recognised that Israel needed strong allies and that it was especially important to have close relations with the US, which has long been the most powerful state in the world.

But why did the US choose Israel? (After all, Israel engaged in actions that might have contravened American interests, often damaging them).

The US initially tried to act in an even-handed way toward Israel and the Arab states.

For example, Washington did not give Israel significant amounts of economic or military aid before 1967 and President Eisenhower forced Israel to abandon the Sinai after the 1956 war.

But as the lobby grew more powerful, US support for Israel not only increased, it also has become essentially unconditional.

This relationship was justified during the Cold War by claiming that Israel was a “strategic asset''. But the Cold War is over and this rationale is no longer convincing.

Golda Meir, Yitzak Rabin, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon are all examples of Israeli leaders maintaining a wide margin of independence (despite Israel's economic, political and military dependence on the US). Is that starting to change? Will it ever change?

Israeli leaders pay attention to the policy preferences of US leaders but they act independently when they disagree with Washington.

Because American presidents fear the lobby, they rarely put pressure on Israel when it is acting in ways that are at odds with their policies.

For example, every president since Lyndon Johnson has opposed the building of colonies in the West Bank but no president has been able to put meaningful pressure on Israel to stop building them.

This situation will not change until a US president is willing to confront the lobby or until the lobby itself recognises that a more even-handed US policy would be better for Israel as well as America.

In today's world, the narrow vision of the “strategic relationship'' no longer meets reality, certainly in this part of the world and in Europe to an extent. Do you agree with this point of view?

The issue is not whether the US-Israel “strategic relationship'' is broad or narrow. Rather, the key issue is whether unconditional US support for Israel is in the American national interest.

In other words, does backing Israel no matter what policies it pursues make the US more respected around the world or make Americans safer at home? Our view is that it does not.

The “special relationship'' is a strategic liability for the US and also not good for Israel. We believe that the US should have a normal relationship with Israel.

It should treat Israel the way it treats other democracies such as Britain, France and Italy.

Specifically, when Israel acts in ways that work to America's advantage, we should support it. But when Israel acts in ways that might hurt the United States, we should distance ourselves from Israel and use our considerable leverage to get it to change its behaviour.

People such as Tim Russert are considered very important in the US media world. But his ability as an interviewer, some would say, pales in comparison with his counterparts in Europe, for example. Are things changing in the US media? Are they starting to ask the tough questions?

It has long been taboo in America's mainstream media to criticise Israeli policy or the US-Israeli relationship or even to talk openly about the power of the Israel lobby.

That situation is slowly beginning to change, although we are still a long way from where we can have an open and informed discourse on this topic.

Alliances in this region have changed a few times over the years. Do you agree that there is a trend in the Arab world to soften up to Israel?

Virtually all the Arab states accept that Israel is not going away and that it makes sense to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and work out a modus vivendi with the Jewish state.

This is the basic position laid out in the Arab League's peace proposal of 2002, which it reaffirmed in 2007.

However, Israel has shown little interest in the proposal.

Are Palestinians being abandoned by the Arab and Muslim world (Jordan and Egypt on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other)?

Those states are not abandoning the Palestinians but they are certainly not doing much to help them.

All three states have close ties with Washington, which they fear will be jeopardised if they push too hard on the Palestinians' behalf.

Egypt and Jordan are especially fearful because they receive substantial foreign aid from the US and they know that the lobby would make sure that their aid was drastically reduced if they pushed Washington to get tough with Israel.

Could a bi-national state work instead of a two-state solution? Not in terms of Israeli willingness but in terms of what would be a lasting solution?

If large majorities on both sides were in favour of a bi-national state, it might be possible. But that is not the case today and probably never will be.

After all, it would mean abandoning the idea of a Jewish state, since the Palestinians will soon outnumber the Jews in the lands between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

It is difficult to imagine Israelis accepting that outcome.

The best hope for peace is a two-state solution and anyone who cares about Israel, the Palestinians, or stability in the broader region should be working hard to make that outcome a reality.

You mentioned in your lectures that we shouldn't expect change from an Obama presidency. Anything to look forward to if he wins?

Obama has pledged that he will not wait until his waning years in office to address the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which is good news.

But it remains to be seen whether he will be willing or able to push Israel to give the Palestinians a viable state of their own.

His actions in the campaign so far, especially his recent speech before AIPAC, give little reason for optimism.

Do you think Iran will be attacked by the US/Israel?

No, because a military strike would not solve the problem.
Indeed, such an attack would make it worse by giving Iran a powerful incentive to acquire nuclear weapons to deter another attack on its homeland.

Plus, Iran would retaliate against the US, which would only complicate America's troubles in the Middle East.

But we never thought that the Bush administration would be so foolish as to invade Iraq and that Israel would be so foolish as to think that it was a good idea.

So an attack against Iran is possible, although unlikely.

Stephen Walt is a professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Programme on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago.

Back of the book

On the experience of writing the book: Did you feel intimidated writing it?

We wrote the book because we thought that America's special relationship with Israel was an important reason why the United States was in so much trouble in the Middle East, and that hardly anybody was willing to talk about that subject.

We were also struck by the profound influence that the Israeli lobby has in shaping America's Middle East policy, and that hardly anybody was willing to talk openly about that either.

We thought that it would be good to write about those subjects and, hopefully, get a conversation going. We believe that it almost always makes good sense to have serious debate about important policy issues.

There is no better way to maximise the prospects of adopting smart policies.

From doing research on the lobby, we knew that some pro-Israel individuals and groups would try to smear us and marginalise us.

This is the lobby's modus operandi for dealing with critics. But we were not intimidated, mainly because we knew the charges that would be levelled against us — such as the claim that we are anti-Semites — would be false.

Did you realise then that it [the book] would have a tremendous impact?

We knew that the original article — and later the book — would attract a great deal of attention, mainly because we were writing about a taboo subject that was also of great strategic and moral significance for the United States, Israel, other countries in the Middle East, and most certainly, the Palestinians, who have suffered so much for so long. Of course, it is too early to tell whether our work on the lobby will have an impact on American foreign policy.

But it seems apparent that we have at least opened a space in the US for talking critically about Israel and America's relationship with the Jewish state.

Are you aware of the “rock-star'' status you have in the Arab/Muslim world?

It is hard for two international relations scholars like us to think of ourselves as “rock stars''.

But we do recognise and greatly appreciate all the attention that our work has received in the Arab and Islamic world, as well as in Europe and the US, and even in Israel.

You recently stated your case in Israel. How would you describe the reaction to your lecture there? Were you asked similar questions?

We had an enjoyable visit in Israel. The discussions were lively but respectful and a wide range of views were expressed. In many ways, our reception in Israel was not much different from how we have been received in Canada, Europe and the US.

We find wherever we go that audiences are glad that someone is finally talking about the lobby and its influence on America's Middle East policy and doing so in a serious and intelligent way.

This is not to say that everyone agrees with all of our arguments but the vast majority of the people we have encountered do believe that the issues we raise need to be openly discussed.

Has the experience of it all been rewarding?

Absolutely. We believe that serious scholars are supposed to tackle important issues and be willing to make controversial arguments.

That is why tenure is such an important institution. Although some of the personal attacks on us have been unpleasant, we have no regrets about having written the book.