Always in harm's way

There is an old joke in the Middle East that goes roughly like this: Israel wants peace with its Arab neighbours — a piece of Lebanon, a piece of Syria, a piece of Jordan, etc.

One can now redraft that state's pathetic search for peaceful coexistence with a search for perpetual bloodletting.

Indeed, beyond the largely meaningless military engagements within or near the Gaza Strip, one wonders whether Israel is actually capable of reaching any kind of accord with the Palestinians — whose land it occupies on Biblical grounds.

One further marvels at Israel's keen interest in altering the existing leadership balance of power, to better influence any potential settlements and, perhaps, impose its own preferences.

Few doubt that a modern military machine's onslaught over a largely civilian population will be transformed into another Israeli “victory''.

Yet what this latest confrontation illustrates is that Israel has an inherent capacity to inflict casualties galore, without any need to find a political solution.

Killing is easy but it is generally the work of unstable characters who hide behind legal interpretations to validate various forms of barbarism.

Justifications abound, ranging from the failed war on terrorism to guilt by association, which was banned by several Geneva conventions.

Naturally the conventions do not apply to the righteous, especially when one can pretend to fight for a cause that is larger than anyone can fathom.

Such behaviour has a simple secret: Place yourself in an orbit of one, flying at such a high altitude that no one can even dream of crossing your path.

It is clever but wrong, deadly but insane, and both mistaken and shortsighted.

As the accompanying timeline illustrates, a six-month ceasefire between Israel and Hamas expired last December 19 when the former suffered periodic rocket firing.

Given conditions on the ground and lack of progress, Hamas amassed its lethal firepower throughout these months, while the Gaza Strip endured a punishing economic blockade.

More important, Israel managed to undermine Hamas's hopes to rule Gaza as it supported the Palestinian Authority's Mahmoud Abbas.

Present crisis: A Hamas perspective

By refusing to open negotiations with Hamas and by telegraphing its readiness to launch military operations against it, Israel was ideally placed to launch its poorly worded “Operation Cast Lead''.

From a Hamas perspective, the six-month ceasefire was appealing but only with a modification that would lift the strangulation that accompanied it.

In fact, Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza and may be said to have robbed the Palestinian Authority of any authority, which isolated it within established Arab circles.

Consequently, the siege was never lifted, which proved embarrassing to Hamas leaders.

Realistically, Esmail Haniyah, Mahmoud Zahar (whose son was killed on January 5, 2009), Ahmad Al Jaabari (who may have been killed in late December 2008) and Osama Mazini were in uncomfortable positions: How could they accept a truce that ensured their safety while Gaza was subjected to collective punishment?

It was this logic that propelled Hamas leaders not to seek a renewal of the ceasefire accord, which effectively ended when rocket firing on Israel increased.

Moreover, and it is important to underline this point, Hamas was determined to force Israel to open the crossings that literally isolated the Gaza Strip from the rest of the world.

With a full blockade in place, and as anticipated, Israel launched a massive assault, reminiscent of its equally devastating attacks on Lebanon in 2006.

Still, it would be a mistake to assume that Hamas, along with its Islamist allies, could easily reap political benefits from the onslaught and the significant material losses in what is already a poor region of the Arab world.

Hamas is no match for the Israeli war machine and any victory claims must be logical, even for a movement that thrives on martyrdom.

While steadfastness may be perceived as a quality in many circles, that might not be enough to regain the political upper hand, especially if its domestic and regional standings suffer.
Ruling over a devastated Gaza and seemingly without long-term political backing from a largely lecture-prone international community that automatically prefers Israel might place Hamas in peril.

The only political solace for Hamas is the terrible bruising that Fatah and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas are also subjected to.

Another Hamas error

Given their limited options, Hamas decision-makers have now enlarged the gap within Palestinian ranks, as they fight guerrilla-style against a modern war machine.

Moreover, Hamas is encouraging those who dream of alternative solutions to this simmering conflict to force the Palestinian Authority's hand into potential solutions that might negate most Palestinian gains during the past few decades.

Indeed, one of the more bizarre alternatives that surfaced recently — reverting the Gaza Strip to Egypt — was made by the sycophant John Bolton, who represented the United States at the United Nations for less than two years.

“The present governance paradigm for the Palestinian people has failed,'' he wrote, “as the “two-state solution based on the Palestinian Authority is stillborn.''

Bolton proposed, instead, a “three-state'' approach, “where Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank in some configuration reverts to Jordanian sovereignty''.

Even worse, he considered paying Egypt and Jordan to do the job, oblivious to Palestinian aspirations for independence from Israeli, Egyptian and Jordanian suzerainty.

The mere fact that such an alternative is discussed vindicates extremist contentions that Western policymakers perceive the Palestinian question as irredeemable.

Almost a century-long resistance is negated by such cavalier declarations, which are meant to ossify nascent realities that deny an entire nation its right to exist and thrive on its own terms and which ensure additional confrontation.

Present crisis: The Israeli perspective

From Israel's perspective, and as the timeline illustrates, six months of overall quiet meant that Hamas rearmed itself even if few attacks occurred.

While the captured Corporal Gilad Shalit was still imprisoned and some sporadic rocket firing continued, casualty levels were insignificant.

What Israel rejected were intensified attacks that preceded and followed the end of the truce.

Simultaneously — and it is important not to ignore internal dimensions that motivate Israeli leaders — domestic constraints propelled them to launch a massive assault, mistakenly assuming that the use of force would permanently alter the balance of power.

At first, Israeli Air Force officers believed military success could be achieved through airpower but opted to launch a ground attack to deny Hamas a political victory.

Massive destruction was necessary, the logic asserted, because Hamas could not re-supply itself and would have to submit.

Where the Israelis erred was in believing that capturing most of the Hamas military and political leaders was an uncomplicated goal, not realising that many others were available and ready to assume command when those in charge fell.

Simply stated, Israel proved unrealistic in confronting a much deeper problem, failing to learn lessons from its previous occupation experience over a densely populated area where potential fighters thrive.

Another Israeli error

By re-occupying Gaza, the Israelis will now empower Hamas, for the latter will be in excellent political position to take over when Israel opts to cut its losses and go home.

In fact, this is a fait accompli because the Palestinian Authority cannot possibly regain control over the Gaza Strip, since it would not prevent an assault in the first place.

Even worse, the latest Israeli mistake will translate in complicated terms for a new ceasefire, which will redraw the regional equation as a new Palestinian balance of power emerges.

The Israeli preference to bring Hamas to its knees, strip it of long-range missile capabilities and dispel the notion that the movement can match it as a fighting institution may be a chimerical dream because few Palestinians will accept such conditions.

There is an Israeli quest to assert a monopoly over destructive capabilities but without an air force of its own, Hamas was never a military threat to Israel to begin with.

Consequently, the movement will claim to have won when the crossings are eventually reopened, while every day of conflict builds its resistance credentials.

Strangely, as Israel hunted down Hamas leaders, new leaders emerged and it is safe to conclude that time is not on Israel's side.

The land invasion illustrated the political confusion that dominates all ongoing discussions.

With many European leaders pushing Israel to end the war, Arab leaders paying attention to infuriated populations, public opinion boiling over the top and the incoming Barack Obama administration compromised even before uttering a single policy statement, the Gaza confrontation raises serious security and stability questions.

An Israeli dream

While the Palestinians' long-term survival is not at risk, Israel seems to have determined that it can no longer negotiate with either the Palestinian Authority or Hamas and must, therefore, search for alternative leaders to force a settlement more to its liking.

Towards that end, it may be considering releasing Marwan Bargouti, a well-known politician and militant leader who rose to fame during the first and second Intifadas in the 1980s and 1990s — and was convicted in 2004 on five counts of murder though he was acquitted on 21 other counts in 33 separate attacks — as a Nelson Mandela-type figure capable of muting passions.

While it may be too early to determine whether the leader of the Al Mustaqbal political party in Palestine can transform himself into a Mandela, chances are excellent that Bargouti will surprise Israeli soothsayers for at least two reasons.

First, Bargouti is acutely aware of the existential confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis and can only accept settlement terms that will allow the creation of a vibrant Palestinian state.

This means a set-up with the wherewithal to defend itself from friends and foes alike. In other words, Bargouti cannot preside over a state protected by a weak police force but must truly assume command.

For him to be like Mandela, it is necessary to find an Israeli F.W. de Clerk or even a P.W. Botha, both of whom understood that apartheid was waning. No Israeli will acknowledge a similar fate for Zionism.

Second, Bargouti was convicted of murder whereas Mandela's incarcerations were for “sabotage'' activities.

Even if one concedes that presidential pardons will cleanse Bargouti's slate, Mandela ushered in a unique phenomenon in contemporary political affairs by creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that truly healed some of apartheid's deep wounds.

While it is not impossible to foresee similar efforts, few Israelis are ready to examine their pre- and post-1948 holocaust of Palestinian inhabitants and Bargouti may not have the wherewithal to offer a clean slate when the bloodbath continues unabated.

There are no Palestinian memorial monuments similar to Yad Vashem in Israel — which solemnly remembers the memory of six million Jews exterminated by the Nazis during the Second World War.

It is time for the Palestinian people to erect such a monument to remember all of the dead at the hands of Israelis during the past century where heads of state can soberly recollect and expiate sins of omission.

We might even have an Israeli Willy Brandt who will visit and offer prayers.

In what was a seminal moment, the former German chancellor and 1971 Nobel Peace prizewinner spontaneously knelt down at the monument to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising during his visit to Poland in December 1970.

That was an act of contrition that allowed reconciliation. Israelis and Palestinians will eventually reach such a stage but no Brandt or Mandela can rise to the occasion as long as the discourse is conducted through tank barrels, attack helicopters and bomber planes.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is an author, most recently of Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008.

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