US will not allow a nuclear Iran

The letter of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to his American counterpart, the first direct contact between the leadership of the two countries since the Islamic revolution in 1979, has been interpreted differently by the two parties.

The Iranian news agency IRNA described the letter as a blueprint of "suggestions for resolving the many problems facing humanity". American officials, on the other hand, described the letter as an attempt by the Iranian leader to disrupt talks on Iran's nuclear programme among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

There is another interpretation, though, to Ahmadinejad's letter to President George W. Bush. Having proven their excellent diplomatic skills and pragmatic inclinations, Iranian foreign policy advisers may have intended to accommodate the fury of the US over their endeavours to acquire nuclear technology. They may have also been seeking to make way for Ahmadinejad to get down from the tree he had earlier climbed.

Iranian officials must have received warnings from their Russian and Chinese friends about the seriousness of the Bush administration to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons. There is, in fact, ample evidence to suggest that the US will, under no circumstances, accept a nuclear Iran in the vitally important region of the Gulf.

The US troubles in Iraq, the declining popularity of Bush at home and the difficulties facing the US project in other parts of the region do not seem sufficient to prevent the US from launching a massive military attack to stop Iran from going nuclear. The stakes are, hence, high for the Bush administration and allowing Iran to possess nuclear weapons will at the very least mean the end of the US national security strategy in the Middle East.

For the past six decades, since the end of the Second World War, US administrations, Democrats and Republicans alike, have been mainly seeking to prevent any power, regional or global, from controlling the oil-rich region of the Gulf. This fear was justified on the grounds that controlling massive oil supplies by unfriendly states would allow them to blackmail the West, which relies for its economic well-being on adequate and cheap oil supplies.

The US spent a large part of its resources during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from reaching the strategically important oil resources of the Gulf region.

The US became more sensitive to the oil question after the 1973 Arab oil embargo; where oil emerged from being essentially a commercial-financial interest of American business and economic interests to become a significant component of the US national interest affecting political and strategic interests and calculations of policy.

The importance of oil supplies for the US was highlighted by the Carter doctrine, which came as a response to both the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force," President Jimmy Carter clearly stated.

US support for both Iran and Iraq

During the Iran-Iraq war the US strategy was to prevent any party from gaining control in the Gulf region. It hence, supported Iran and Iraq at different times. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to Carter, admitted in his memoirs that "a CIA officer gave a briefing in Tehran to members of the Bazargan government in which he presented satellite photographs and other evidence of Iraqi invasion preparations" against the Islamic government of Iran.

In fact, according also to Brzezinski, US arms did not stop flowing to Iran, through Israel, even during the hostage crisis with "the knowledge and tacit approval of the Carter's administration".

The Reagan administration, which succeeded Carter's, was divided over which side the US should support: Islamist, anti-communist Iran or secularist, pro-Soviet Iraq. Some US officials advocated the argument that Khomeini's Iran, which at the time moved hastily to garner support in the Islamic world against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, better served US strategy in the region.

However, the disclosure of the Iran-Contra affair put an end to this argument and prevented further co-operation with the Khomeini regime. Washington was forced to distance itself from Tehran and tilt largely towards Iraq.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US decided to intervene militarily to prevent Saddam from possessing too much oil to impose his will on the West. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was partly driven by the desire to secure adequate oil supplies and thwart China's oil ambitions.

All this suggests that the US must be absolutely serious about stopping Iran from becoming a hegemon power in the Gulf region notwithstanding the many difficulties it faces at home and abroad. The Iranian leadership must have realised how dangerous this game is and hence may have decided to approach the Americans and get them to talk about what concerns them.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is a Lecturer in Media and International Relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.