Understanding Syria-Iran alliance

The resumption of peace talks between Syria and Israel and the prospect of a peace treaty between the two sworn enemies have triggered questions about a probable shift in the regional balance of power and the likelihood of producing a new Middle Eastern order.

Analysts are mainly interested in the future of Syrian-Iranian relations and the impact of Syrian-Israeli peace on them. And with the advent of a new administration in the White House, many seek answers to questions such as: Is Syria's relation with Iran strategic or tactical? Is it a catholic marriage or a marriage of convenience? Can Syria be nudged away from Tehran? Why should Syria give up its relations with Tehran and at what price? What are the incentives; the cost and the benefits?

These questions are hypothetical and as a consequence there are no simple answers for most of them. Defining the factors which have contributed to the establishment, endurance and stamina of the Syrian-Iranian alliance should nevertheless help clarify some aspects of the most puzzling and most effective partnership in the Middle East.

For the past few years, the Syrian-Iranian alliance proved to be a major hurdle to US plans in the region; and as such destroying it became a major foreign policy interest for the Bush administration. Since the invasion of Iraq, Washington has tried to break up this alliance but with little success. Isolation, sanctions and intimidation have yielded only the reverse effect.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance was established after the Islamic revolution in 1979. It gained strategic importance only after the coming of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose supportive statements compensated for the lack of sympathy in the Arab world. Political, economic, military and other agreements were signed between the two countries and Iran became the largest foreign investor in Syria. The Lebanon war of July 2006 signified the importance of this alliance.

Necessity

From a Syrian perspective the marriage with Iran was a matter of necessity more than a choice. It is based on several considerations. Iran compensated for the loss of Egypt in the Arab Israeli balance of power after the Camp David Accord. It also compensated for the lack of Arab economic handouts, halted after the Iran-Iraq war.

The shared animosity towards the Saddam Hussain regime provided one more reason to consolidate this alliance. The support of the religiously-oriented regime in the confrontation between the Syrian regime and the Muslim brotherhood in the early 1980s was also vital. Iran proved to be also useful in Lebanon especially after the Israeli invasion of 1982, the establishment of Hezbollah, and the revival of the Shiite community.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance began as purely defensive and throughout the 1980s and 1990s its major area of interest was Lebanon. The occupation of Iraq transformed it, giving Syria one more reason to get closer to Tehran to abort US attempts to destabilise the regime in Damascus.

From an Iranian perspective, relations with Syria were extremely important to prevent the Iraq-Iran war from turning into an Arab-Iranian conflict or a Sunni-Shiite divide. Syria's contributions to Iran's war efforts were also valuable. Syria closed the Iraqi Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline, depriving Saddam Hussain from an important financial resource.

Syria was compensated with cheap Iranian oil. Had Syria chosen to stand by Iraq, it could not only have weakened Iran's position, but could have also closed the circle on the venerable revolutionary regime in Tehran.

Syria was viewed by Tehran as a primary partner in the Arab-Israeli conflict, offering Iran a symbolic political role in the central cause of the region. In Lebanon, Iran sought to secure Hezbollah's political and military presence in the south with Syrian approval. The occupation of Iraq increased Syria's importance to Tehran, giving it vital access to most of the region's problems. Through Syria, Iran could use most of its regional cards as a bargaining chip concerning its nuclear programme and threats by the US military.

Marinating this alliance has not always been an easy business, however. Damascus and Tehran have at times been at pain to hide disagreements. The religious regime in Tehran and secular regime in Damascus have had difficulties justifying their relationship domestically.

The two countries are also at odds over a number of regional issues. While Iran supports federation in Iraq (probably partition), Syria stands against it. Iran prefers a weak, Iran-friendly, Shiite-dominated Iraq. Syria, by contrast, seeks a relatively strong, secular Iraq with a clear Arab identify. In Palestine, Iran supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad to further its interests and influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict; Syria supports them as a means to reach final peace settlement with Israel.

Regardless, the Syrian-Iranian alliance has survived all sorts of difficulties over the past three decades and is likely to endure as long as common interests keep the two countries together.

Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations, at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Damascus University, Syria.