The virtues of strategic patience

While US presidential rivals John McCain and Barack Obama debate whether the "surge" has worked or not, the subject of their debate may no longer be relevant.

The "surge" was about beefing up US troops in Iraq to enable the new Iraqi army to move onto the offensive against Al Qaida, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite gangs collectively known as Jaish Al Mahdi (JAM). The "surge" required the addition of five more combat brigades plus three Marine units, 22,000 troops to the American contingent.

By the middle of this month, however, all those additional units had left Iraq, bringing down the total number of US troops to 146,000, the lowest since 2003. In other words, the "surge" has already achieved the goals that President George W. Bush set for it a year ago. What Iraq faces today is the post-surge period. There is no sense to continue debating whether the "surge" would work or not. Everyone knows, and everyone except Obama and the US House of Representatives' Speaker Nancy Pelosi, would agree, that it has.

The success of the "surge" was not solely, or even essentially, due to the presence of additional units, although those soldiers tackled a Herculean task with heroism. The real message of the "surge" was political.

It told the enemies of the United States inside Iraq and outside that America would not cut and run. The claims that the US was "a tired, wounded giant" with no more fight in it, or as the BBC put it "a big beast in agony", were proved wrong. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's claim that the world had entered the "post-American era" was proved baseless.

Democrat Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid's demand that the US admit defeat and surrender in Iraq was exposed as a piece of cheap partisanship.

The message of the "surge" was that if America wanted to defend itself, it could.

Once it had become clear that the US, far from beginning to take its troops out, was actually bringing in more, all those involved in the struggle over the future of Iraq readjusted their strategies.

Arab Sunnis realised that they had no chance of destroying a new democratic system backed by America's power. So, encouraged by moderate Arab states, they decided to fall into line. The fact that the US helped organise and arm them, also assured them that their Shiite and Kurdish rivals would not be able to impose a new dictatorship.

Al Qaida and its affiliates also began to realise that without local support they were vulnerable to even deadlier American attacks. According to the buzz in jihadist circles, Al Qaida's losses in Iraq in the past six months have been twice larger than its total losses between 2003 and 2007.

Self-preservation dictated that Al Qaida take as fighters as it could out of Iraq, transferring them to new destinations for jihad.

Decisively defeated

Iran also changed its strategy, at least temporarily. When it tried to seize control of Basra, Iraq's second largest city and capital of its oil-rich south, Tehran was decisively defeated by the new Iraqi army and its US-backers in a series of battles that changed the strategic balance. The mullahs understood that, at least as long as Bush was in the White House, the Americans would be around and capable of biting.

Syria also got the message of the "surge". The US was not being driven out of the Middle East and the Khomeinist regime in Tehran was not emerging as the shaper of the region's future. This is why President Bashar Assad of Syria suddenly accepted a Turkish offer of mediation with Israel, an offer that was first made in 2005. And this is why Bashar has asked France's President Nicolas Sarkozy to tell Washington that Damascus is ready to move away from Tehran.

Moderate Arab states that had tried to isolate new Iraq also changed their stance. They saw the "surge" as a sign that the US was committed to its promise of helping Iraq build a viable state. The "surge" showed that the US was not the fickle friend whom no one should trust.

This is why moderate Arab states decided to reopen their embassies in Baghdad and name ambassadors there. Kuwait has already named an ambassador and eight other states have said they would soon name envoys. This is why Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, initially treated almost as a leper by his Arab brethren, is suddenly showered with red-carpet invitations to Arab capitals.

This is why Lebanon's principal Sunni political leader Sa'ad Hariri has rushed to Iraq to secure Grand Ayatollah Sistani's support in resolving the Lebanese crisis.

The debate over withdrawal from Iraq is irrelevant. For, if American troops have nothing useful to do there, there would be no sense in keeping them. (As the withdrawal of "surge" unit shows, once the job is done, they return home.) If, on the other hand, American troops continue to play a useful role in the interests of the United States and its allies, it would be a folly to withdraw them because of partisan calculations.

Reformist and moderate forces must be helped to build a new Middle East that is free, democratic and prosperous. The US can and must help them in their epic struggle against the forces of fascism and obscurantism. America's national security requires reform and democratic change in the Middle East. It is based on its enlightened self-interest that the US should develop a new regional strategy.

The US should remain committed to Iraq for as long as the Iraqis feel they need such a commitment. The future US president must not, assume that because the Americans came to Iraq uninvited, they could also leave without being asked to do so.

In 1949, President Harry S. Truman spoke of "strategic patience" when justifying American military presence in Western Europe. Today, that simple phrase looks like a key test of leadership for America.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.