The appearance of incompetence

During a recent visit to the Gulf region, a savvy interlocutor, someone I consider a friend, asked me to explain an American tendency to wallow in scandal. "Why is everyone in Washington harping on the president to fire his attorney general," he asked? "Do you not face enough scandals as it is?"

My haphazard explanations proved illusory for I could not, in all honesty, offer a truthful answer. Upon reflection, I thought to use this column to bridge the gap, one that may shed some light on why Americans behave in peculiar ways.

Whether it is the latest Bush Administration proclivity to skirt an issue, or earlier ones practised by every single government, Americans despise incompetence.

Few object to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales firing a handful of federal prosecutors. Rather, most reject attempts to offer lame excuses, allowing scandals to develop where simple truth would suffice. No one really cares that some law officers aggressively prosecuted opponents of the government.

Likewise, few objected to former president Bill Clinton having an affair with a young White House aide. Instead, plenty of folks protested to Clinton's convoluted explanations, even gargantuan appetite to redefine common English grammatical definitions [what does one mean by "is"?].

Today, Bush and his team appear to wallow in incompetence, precisely because they refuse to acknowledge their partisan practices.

As a people, Americans are tolerant, easy-going, and I would argue, thick-skinned. They can see through a lie fairly quickly and even in those instances when they are scared to voice an opinion - yes, in the post 9/11 environment, plenty of folks are afraid to question the wisdom of authority - many muster the courage to remain inquisitive.

We simply do not like officials who muff about. We certainly think that inaccurate and misleading testimonies from the president down to his cabinet officers, to lower ranking bureaucrats, all of whom are supposed to serve the public, have no place in the socio-political discourse of our democratic experiment.

Circumstances

We do not like it but circumstances impose different solutions. When we are given a dose of half-truths or outright lies, Americans rebel. It may take a little while but a fuming American is not a pretty sight. One who carries a grudge because he was lied to is even uglier. At first, we reject absurd explanations and make jokes of the mighty and powerful, assigning them the level of respect they deserve.

Comedians such as John Stewart impartially mock where ridicule is justified. Moreover, as we realise that politicians abuse privileges we grant them, Americans remind them of their limited shelf-lives. Few survive regular plebiscites and we dish right back whatever dirt is lobbed towards us.

Simply stated, we know fraud when we see it, even if it means our patience is frequently tested. Americans do not cherish scandals, but are not shy of costly and time consuming investigations, especially when obstruction of justice is suspected.

Our political character, ironically best understood by a Frenchman, was defined by Alexis de Tocqueville in his brilliant Democracy in America in 1835.

Speculated

Tocqueville speculated that American democracy could degenerate into what he called "soft despotism".

He described the tyranny of the majority, but observed that the country was capable of overcoming internal crises, because of its institutional checks and balances.

In short, he appreciated this democracy's functional aspects that, naturally, rejected lies and incompetence.

I mailed my friend a copy of the de Tocqueville book in the hope that this erudite study will help clarify why periodic scandals are healthy: they slowly enhance competence levels.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a Middle East affairs analyst. He has penned several books on the Gulf, including "Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman", "The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership", "Succession in Saudi Arabia", and "Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy".