'Secular' Saddam was suspicious of Al Qaida

'Secular' Saddam was suspicious of Al Qaida

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Although very few people thought that there were any connections between Saddam Hussain and Al Qaida, numerous military and civilian researchers went through 100,000 (out of an estimated 600,000 plus) documents captured after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, to reach this definitive conclusion.

In a semi-official paper, the 94 pages Institute for Defence Analyses (IDA) declassified version of the Pentagon-sponsored report, was quietly released this week. Titled Iraqi Perspectives Project - Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, the IDA uncovered ties between the Baathist regime and a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and so-called Islamist "terrorist" organisations, without finding a "direct operational link" between the Saddam Hussain regime and Al Qaida.

The account discusses how Baghdad used operatives to advance its causes, precisely as any state-actor would do. This is an important point because the use of violence by a State, versus a non-State party, is understood differently under international law.

Over the years, a variety of organisations worked together in pursuit of shared goals, but most of Saddam Hussain's security services primarily tracked and eliminated Iraqi exiles, Shiites and Kurdish dissidents, along with anyone perceived to be an opponent of the regime.

Why is this revelation important?

First, because the report contradicts what President George W. Bush and several of his aides, have repeatedly declared. The time has come to put this canard to bed because the alleged relationship was false, and it is critical to finally accept this detail.

Unlike the issue of weapons of mass destruction, which existed in significant quantities before United Nations inspectors systematically destroyed them, one of the reasons for invading Iraq after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, was the putative link with Al Qaida. No one can make this assertion anymore with a straight face.

Second, the falsity of this assertion significantly tarnished the American reputation for transparency. When in September 2002 Donald H. Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defence, claimed that the United States had "bulletproof" evidence of operational cooperation between Osama Bin Laden's group and the secular Iraqi dictatorship, he was being less than transparent.

Even the otherwise lucid Colin Powell, a warrior-diplomat with years of experience, alluded to multiple linkages between Saddam Hussain and Al Qaida. Who can forget his February 5, 2003 United Nations Security Council assertions?

Since his illustrations turned out to be spurious, any analyst who worries about restoring Washington's reputation, must come to terms with this critical issue: One earns a reputation, and when it is blemished, one must cleanse it.

Third, because the report was produced by a federally-funded research think-tank, albeit under contract to the US Joint Forces Command, few can question the IDA's impartiality.

Consequently, what kind of reaction should we have when we hear Senator John McCain, the presumptive Republican Party nominee, declare on the campaign trail that "Al Qaida is in Iraq?" Given that the IDA established there were no such links before 2003, one must conclude that they disembarked into Iraq, after that date.

McCain may be right in his statement but one of the Democratic Party contenders, Senator Barack Obama, was equally correct when he retorted that "there was no such thing as Al Qaida in Iraq until George Bush and John McCain decided to invade."

Because Al Qaida did not emerge in Iraq until 2004, there is a genuine difference of interpretation, and it is no longer possible to conclude that both critics and supporters of the war were candid.

While a benefit of doubt attitude could be encouraged in the past, this will no longer wash. The IDA testimony reveals truths and it shows plenty. Nothing more, nothing less, and the greatest surprise is that there are no surprises.

Saddam Hussain ruled a secular regime. He was wary of religious fanatics and fought those we consider to be extremists. He allocated financial and military support to opposition groups, albeit of his preferred variety, and welcomed Palestinian guerrilla Abu Nidal to Baghdad, before ordering his assassination in August 2002.

He bargained with truncated Arab allegiances but was consistent in loathing religious figures. Indeed, he premeditated the murder of leading Shiite clerics with impunity, and even waged an 8-year long war with Iran on secularist terms.

Distrustful

This new study now confirms these lay credentials, and while this is not the first effort to refute earlier administration contentions about linkages between Saddam Hussain and Al Qaida, it is the most authoritative.

A devastating September 2006 study published by the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that the Iraqi strongman was "distrustful of Al Qaida and viewed Islamist extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from Al Qaida to provide material or operational support".

At the time, partisan Republican senators dismissed the Senate account, allegedly because it lacked objectivity under Democratic control. This can hardly be claimed about the IDA study.

Saddam Hussain cared little for those who stood in his way and was willing to use extreme methods to achieve his goals. He was an Easterner by persuasion but a Westerner by temperament. He was, in short, and this newest report proves it, a secularist.

Dr. Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.

Illustration: Nino Jose Heredia/Gulf News

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