Russia ties itself to Al Assad

The situation in Syria is likely to attract some kind of international action outside the United Nations after Russia and China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, even though it had been dramatically softened to try to meet their objections.

The resolution, which was put to vote last Saturday, called on President Bashar Al Assad to stop the violence and killing in Syria and to respond to calls trying to find a Syrian-led solution to the 11-month crisis. This was much watered down from an earlier version which called on Al Assad to step down from the presidency, and hand over power to his deputy, as a prelude to starting talks with the opposition about forming a transitional government.

The changes had met Russian objections by removing any reference to support for sanctions or an arms embargo, and also made clear that the resolution would not be used to authorise military intervention or regime change. That would have been vital since the Russians feel that they were deliberately fooled by Nato over the resolution on Libya, which on the face of it was to save civilian lives, but was then used as an excuse for full-scale intervention and support for regime change.

But all this work failed to meet Russian objections. The Russians want to remain loyal to their sole ally in the Arab world and to support the Al Assad regime. In addition, the Russian president and prime minister want to act tough in an election year, and such foreign drama adds to their profile at home, whatever misery it might cause in Syria.

But by doing this the Russians have boxed themselves into a very narrow range of options tied to the present Syrian establishment fighting to the last man as either civil war spreads, or the opposition gains in control. Obviously, the Russians are gambling on a third scenario in which the army retains control and outlasts the opposition, but that seems a very desperate gamble.

What next?

But now the resolution has failed, the question is what happens next. It is clear that the regime will continue its fierce military suppression of the opposition, and many tens of and hundreds of Syrians will be killed on a weekly basis. This will outrage the regional and international community, and will lead to calls for intervention, and several countries have already spoken of this.

Legitimacy

The failure at the Security Council might suit those countries who want to take more determined action, since they can now point to the veto and say "we tried, but now we have to move on". The ongoing massacre in Homs will only make this kind of thinking more urgent and give it increased legitimacy.

Turkey has floated the idea of humanitarian corridors, France and the UK have aired some thoughts, and the Arab League has offered a specific plan for Al Assad to step down in favour of his deputy while the country prepares for a transition to a new more inclusive government.

All these ideas need to be assembled in one place, so it is possible that a ‘Friends of Syria' committee will be formed, which could include both League members and other Arab states, as well as international players like the UK and France, along with others which might in the long term want to give aid, technical or economic support to a re-born Syria.

In such a group, the League could appoint a special envoy for Syria, and all the members would be able to co-ordinate their activities, even to the extent of keeping themselves aware of any emerging military option. Some states are probably already sending arms to Syrian opposition fighters, and others may be ready to offer practical support.

But support for the Syrian opposition forces is about as far as this kind of military action is likely to go. It is hard to see how an international force could meet domestic Syrian political objectives in this crisis, and despite growing fury at Al Assad's brutality, there is still a consensus that external military intervention will not be part of the answer.

Incentives

Most of the action will be around diplomatic moves and economic sanctions to increase the pressure on Damascus. But for these moves to succeed, the officers and senior officials of the Al Assad regime have to be offered some kind of incentive. They will have to want to take part in a transition to a more inclusive Syria, in which they will play a dramatically less significant role.

The officer corps in the army and security services, and the senior officials in government, are all from the same Alawite sect as Al Assad. In the present situation, they see themselves as embattled on all sides and they must feel that they are conducting a last stand in which they have little option other than to hang onto power as long as possible since their other option is disgrace, jail, or worse.

This is the political challenge that the opposition, and any of the ‘Friends of Syria' will have to deal with when they look ahead to building a new Syria.