Lebanon's complex political equations

Thirty-eight days hence, Lebanon will boast a new parliament, affirming its unique democratic capabilities against some odds. While neither the numeric balance between Muslim and Christian parliamentarians (64 each), nor the allocation of key portfolios to the president, prime minister, or speaker will change, leading observers believe that the election may be too close to call. What are the consequences of these key elections for Lebanon and the region at large?

A few weeks before the actual plebiscite, few foresee a landslide for one coalition or another, and even fewer anticipate fundamental changes on June 8. In fact, the most common assessments concentrate on the following three scenarios: a thin March 14 victory, a slim majority for March 8, or a hung parliament where neither the majority nor the opposition will score an upset.

For many seasoned Lebanon watchers, a minor March 14 victory will mean that on June 8, Beirut will face the same political conundrum it faces today, with the opposition insisting on a coalition government where it will yield its legendary veto power that makes Lebanese politics resemble its folklore.

Likewise, these observers opine, a negligible March 8 victory will probably create a deadlock, especially since several March 14 leaders telegraphed their desires not to accept a future role either as part of a unity government or as a veto-yielding minority.

In the event, it may be necessary to consider two other scenarios, hovering around significant gains for either alliance.

While unpredictable, a major victory for Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement will give the Hezbollah-led March 8 partnership an unambiguous triumph, which will require them to secure current holdings (53 seats) and add a dozen more.

This is easier said than done, but with Hezbollah's blessings, a combative Aoun is actually seeking to bolster his shaky claim to be the principle Christian leader by wrestling on all fronts.

Motivated by a desire to pick up three easy seats in the South, for example, Aoun insists that the Christian posts in the Jezzine District (two Maronites and one Greek Catholic) must be his. The trouble is that Speaker Nabih Berri has three allies occupying them at present, and he would like them to prevail.

Berri was not thrilled when Aoun "reclaimed" Jezzine a year ago during one of his rare visits to the area. Indeed, the astute and immensely flexible Berri did not appreciate Aoun's sly remark, attributing to the speaker a gangster-like disposition by holding Southern Christian seats hostage.

Aoun's wrath was not exclusively targeted against Berri. He uttered similar comments in a visit to East Beirut, proclaiming that he would "free" Achrafieh from fellow Christians and, towards that end, announced the creation of a popular list stacked with docile acolytes.

Of course, while he may never forgive Berri from refraining to support him during his desperate 2008 efforts to win the highest office in the land, Aoun is in fact on a suicidal collision course with two other leaders: Michel Sulaiman, who is perceived as a happy-middle-of-the-road president of the republic, who will always promote reconciliation, and his ultimate nemesis, Maronite Patriach Mar Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, whom he despises with a vengeance.

Sfeir and Sulaiman represent the traditional balance of power within the predominant Christian community, which Aoun resents, and which he would like to renovate.

Today, neither Berri nor Hezbollah have an interest in upsetting the National Charter, which will certainly face a challenge should Aoun overcome. His victory, and few should doubt that it would be his alone, will translate in a coup de tête within parliament to alter the Constitution.

A new majority will then be asked to abrogate Sulaiman's 2008 elections and vote for Aoun. Though improbable, Lebanon's Shia leaders will place themselves in front of such an epochal dilemma, with cataclysmic consequences.

The other scenario is a significant loss for Aounists, say by ten seats, especially in the Metn, a defeat that will muzzle him for good and prompt Hezbollah to reevaluate its military role as Lebanon adopts a new defence strategy.

Such an outcome is not improbable because Michel Murr, a local leader who is well known for delivering goodies to his constituents, has a formidable list of seven candidates in the Metn. In a remarkable tour de force, Murr left the eight position, which is dedicated to the Armenian Orthodox community, vacant.

Ostensibly accommodating to Armenian voters by giving them a free choice, Murr essentially split them in two, with one half going to the Aounist Hagop Pakradounian while the other is locked with Murr. In this most likely situation, Murr's list will emerge victorious, and deny Aoun the majority he craves.

Beyond regional repercussions on domestic Lebanese affairs, especially with respect to the ongoing and escalating Egyptian-Iranian clash, the June 7 poll is likely to be peaceful, although no one can rule out homegrown instability along the May 7 model if Aounists lose big.

For the first time in a long time, Lebanese elections will witness several triangular races involving competing lists, which will further pit powerful leaders against each other.

How they cancel one another will be depressing indeed.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.

Thank you, Dr. Kechichian, for this comprehensive and interesting analysis.
Iness Arut
Dubai,UAE
Posted: April 30, 2009, 18:31