GCC states must work closely together

For their 30th Summit meeting in Kuwait, conservative Arab Gulf leaders embarked on yet another search for security and stability, both of which hang by a bare thread. To be sure, the oft-repeated "one Gulf, one destiny, one nation" slogan sounds good, but everyone knows that there are several Gulfs, fates and nations in the area, whose interests coincide as much as they diverge.

Since 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has transformed itself into an effective alliance and overcome horrendous challenges. Still, to assume that member-states are on the same wavelength would be optimistic, and it remains to be determined whether those attending the summit will manage to implement palpable new decisions.

On the political and security front, the Summit communiqué offered its customary praise of the heroic Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation, and repeated its steadfastness with Lebanon. Though Gulf leaders care deeply about both of these questions, the challenges of the peace process surpass any means to significantly affect change in Washington. Sadly, GCC states' relationships with the superpower, which can make a difference, are skewed to serve non-Arab interests.

As far as Iran, Iraq and now Yemen are concerned, however, GCC leaders can do a great deal more. In the aftermath of the post-2003 war for Iraq, Gulf leaders confronted the nascent Iraqi challenge — Baghdad is still the Arab regional heavyweight in so many ways — though few tackled the Iraqi leadership potential. Whether GCC officials are ready to adopt a pre-emptive strategy towards Iraq, ostensibly to prevent an internal implosion from spilling over to the Arabian Peninsula, is impossible to know, although Iraq will become far more important than many assume if for no other reason than to maintain the regional balance of power with Iran.

Equally important is the lack of a collective perception of Iran as a source of threat to Arab interests. Qatar and Oman, in particular, embarked on a political line that is substantially different from those espoused by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Both Doha and Muscat see merit in closer dialogue with Tehran precisely to avoid an impossible security challenge. They point to the recent clashes in Yemen, arguably fuelled by Iranian interferences, which place them at odds with Riyadh in particular. In fact, alliance rules clearly state that a threat to one member automatically commits all others to rush to its defence, and while both Qatar and Oman expressed unequivocal support to Saudi Arabia, the fact remains that neither identifies Yemeni Al Houthis as a source of danger to regional security.

Al Houthi rebels

In the event, Saudi Arabia is now entangled in a serious war against the Al Houthis along its tense borders with Yemen, whose own ineptitude, along with Riyadh's optimism, will translate into a long-term confrontation. The area is rugged and ideally suited to military infiltrations, which effectively means that outside powers can intervene with relative ease, a reality that will further solidify the Saudi "will" to defend every square inch of their land. King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz probably spoke bluntly to his fellow GCC leaders in his inimitable style, drawing clear lines in the rock, to prevent further divisions. He must have told his brothers that the Al Houthi situation in Yemen is tied to Iran's relationship with rebels, in turn linked to Tehran's posture on the world arena as it negotiates an inevitable nuclearisation.

GCC leaders examined Iran's nuclear programme in earnest, and while they seriously wish to avoid a "disastrous military confrontation" between Iran and any number of regional and international actors, they must be wary of secret deals that could be ushered in at their own expense. That is why GCC states repeatedly insist on inclusion in any negotiations to better defend their interests. In fact, Iran worries Gulf leaders, and while everyone would like to avoid a military strike against it, all realise that a confrontation looms on the horizon. If the international community were to impose additional economic sanctions on Tehran, GCC states will inevitably be obligated to respect them in full, which will severely affect the UAE, especially Dubai. Though the final communiqué did not reveal it, GCC leaders pondered this critical question, if only to be ready for an eventuality that will add to the economic difficulties experienced throughout the region.

This, in the end, is the GCC's key challenge: How to leverage the Gulf region's tremendous energy and financial resources without becoming a target to predators galore. Under the circumstances, it is fair to ask whether GCC states can finally adopt common policies to buttress their security and economic structures. Is the decision to create a rapid deployment force sufficient to meet imminent threats? Can the GCC absorb the recent Dubai financial problems in a way that is bold and creative — that is, to encourage Dubai's innovations, notwithstanding short-term adjustments, without jeopardising regional stability?

If the answers to such questions are in the affirmative, then the GCC Summit will be more than a two-day extravaganza and accomplish more than a new power grid or a common railway network. If not, the boldness and creativity that accompanied the GCC's formation will wither on the proverbial vine.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.