Democracy in the Middle East

A critical article on "democracy" appeared last Monday in the widely read Washington Post that deserves attention. Journalist Peter Baker argued that the Bush Administration staked its reputation (no pun intended) to work towards an end of tyranny. The author concluded that "the march of freedom seemed stalled", because so few were "committed to his vision". What is one to make of this?

It is fairly obvious that there are not too many ways to encourage the spread of democracy. One can encourage change in a particular country, to adopt tested institutions (parliaments, courts, free press, etc...), or modify mechanisms to eliminate less stellar features. Either way, one almost always redefines democracy, for unlike goods and services, little of it can be imposed from outside.

Still, Washington was not discouraged by the immense tasks to establish liberal democracies in the Arab World, even if it concluded that there was no urgency to first help establish pesky little necessities like constitutions. In fact, overzealous supporters anticipated that democracy was an end rather than a means, because no democracy managed to end tyranny to date. Rather, what brought down past tyrannical regimes were constitutions that usurped revolutionary behaviour; history teaches us that democratic leaders were elected through constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms.

Baker tells us that Bush was inspired by Natan Sharansky, the Soviet refusenik and Israeli politician - who championed colonial outposts in occupied Palestine - who was/is a favourite of neoconservative sages. In The Case for Democracy, Sharansky wrote that a tyrannical state was impotent because it was inherently weak, thus creating opportunities for dissent and liberation.

Whether inspired by Sharansky or others, Washington detected an opportunity to buttress the "war on terrorism" by equipping its Iraq adventure with an ideological support. Consequently, the introduction of democracy in the Arab World became a cornerstone of the Bush response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, especially after the WMD fiasco in Mesopotamia unravelled his credibility.

Critical developments

Starting in early 2004, the US president was buoyed by several critical developments that were quite encouraging: the strong Iraqi participation to elect an interim parliament; the Cedar Revolution that toppled Lebanon's pro-Syrian government; and Egypt's multi-candidate presidential elections that encouraged limited debate even if the outcome was a foregone conclusion.

The clutch arrived with the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections because Israeli leaders feared that Hamas would win. Even Sharansky urged Washington to impose a postponement of the vote on the Palestinian National Authority, arguing that democracy was about building institutions and civil society, not just holding elections.

Against Israeli wishes, the vote went ahead if for no other reason than to uphold America's dwindling legitimacy in the Middle East and, perhaps, to strengthen the much weakened presidency of Mahmoud Abbas. Overnight, the Hamas win transformed the Bush advocacy into a "dangerously naïve" scheme, by those who cared little about egalitarianism.

According to Baker, Bush was exasperated that little progress was achieved in the Arab World, and considered himself to be "a dissident in Washington," because "bureaucracy in the US d[id] not help change". This, you guessed it, from the mouth of the most powerful man in the world.

Remarkably, senior officials lamented that several years after the 2004 Bush pledge to spread democracy, American bureaucracy (meaning State Department mandarins) was bogging down progress, although the president was steadfast in his objective: to end tyranny even if the undertaking would take generations. His advisers were adamant: The Bush objective was/is to institutionalise this perspective and let time gradually transform it into US policy.

Although wishing to end tyranny and protecting embattled human rights defenders are commendable, they seldom alter fundamental institutions, because forcing people to accept a particular way of life, or a specific form of government, usually backfires.

We should remember that major Western societies painstakingly build their democracies over more than 500 years of gradual steps toward democratisation. They refined the process through civil wars and myriad court decisions that often trampled on the rights of the weak to protect acquired privileges by the strong. Yet, future generations benefited from past sacrifices, as entire societies were transformed to uphold and obey laws.

Similar process

It may thus be accurate to posit that Algerians, Lebanese, and Palestinians today are going through a similar process in the Arab World. Despite serious clashes, they are nevertheless strengthening their democratic institutions at different paces, but at a much faster rate than Western societies did after the Renaissance.

Sadly, the Baker essay highlights why the United States - certainly a champion of freedoms - embarks on many adventures, without weighing the consequences of its good intentions. How difficult can it be to understand that one cannot invest a government in a nation that values its own traditions?

If the Bush "democracy programme" failed it may be that it was too ambitious. A more modest approach - not to dictate to the rest of the world what kind of government is acceptable but to enhance what is already valuable - may be a better way to go. Rather than rely on Sharansky's stale ideas, the Bush Administration ought to expand on the epochal perspectives enunciated by Thomas Jefferson: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness for each and every human being.

Dr. Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.