American internationalism

The case for American retrenchment has gained new traction in Washington. Much as in the past, economic problems and public war-weariness have spurred calls from Democrats and Republicans alike for neo-isolationist policies — demands for retreat from the world clothed in the language of fiscal prudence and disinterested realism. Although there may be short-term political benefits in calling for a diminished US role in the world, history shows that retreat comes with substantial long-term costs for the US.

After the First World War, disillusionment with war and then the Great Depression brought a widely popular US retreat from internationalism, economic as well as political. However, the attack on Pearl Harbour demonstrated that the US could not avoid the responsibility of engagement with the world in the cause of freedom and democracy. After the Second World War, scepticism about the extent of the communist threat led to a sharp reduction in military spending and a willingness to ignore ominous developments along the Pacific Rim and in Eastern Europe. But when communist aggression reached a boiling point on the Korean Peninsula, moral duty and national interests again compelled the US to lead. The cost of the war that followed certainly exceeded that of effective deterrence and of steadily maintaining US armed forces.

When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, some argued that the US had fulfilled its obligation to lead the world and had defeated all plausible opponents; defence funding was slashed. Ten years later, the attacks of September 11 reminded Americans of the risks of assuming that peace will always prevail. Today, America is in danger of again repeating this cycle. Progress in the fight against Al Qaida and the perceived costs of global leadership have led some to question whether the US should retain — or is even capable of retaining — a robust international economic and political presence. Yet, missing from the debate are analyses of both the benefits of this role, rather than just the costs, and whether the strategic ends to which the country aspires have somehow changed.

History has shown that, once the US chooses to lead, Americans and the world benefit. After the Second World War, US aid helped rebuild shattered European and Asian economies. Those nations are now not simply at peace — they are among America’s most important trading partners. The US naval presence on the high seas has guaranteed free flow of goods. Without it, increased piracy, lower trade flows and higher prices would result — not just for the US but for the world. The hundreds of millions who rose out of poverty in the latter half of the 20th century are markets for US goods and forces for stability that might never have existed without the global impact secured by US leadership. Rather than cutting first and then asking how one can manage with what is left, America must define its priorities and interests — and only then determine how to allocate resources. If the US is still committed to fostering a freer and more democratic world, supporting free trade, maintaining international stability and meeting threats abroad, then there must be a reasoned discussion of the ways in which diplomatic retrenchment and military budget cuts may limit America’s capacity to achieve those critical national goals.

Just as the benefits of US global leadership are often ignored, so, too, are the costs of retrenchment. Proposed cuts in aid and military strength, especially when implemented under strategic guidance that calls for a “small footprint” in the world, will affect America’s ability to deter the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, Syria, a more assertive China, Al Qaida and other terrorist organisations and individuals. US disengagement will also foster the emergence of military, diplomatic or economic forces that will fill the vacuum created by America’s absence. America cannot predict how much it may ultimately cost to counter those forces but, again, experience dictates that the price will be high. Time and again when America has sought to predict the nature, timing and location of the next crisis, it has been wrong.

In 1948, president Harry Truman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Arthur Vandenberg — an erstwhile isolationist — came to a consensus that would shape American foreign policy for decades; it took the Korean War for this country to fully accept both the burdens and the benefits of robust internationalism. America must not wait for another catastrophe to persuade it of the continuing importance of American internationalism. Regardless of party or ideology, its leaders must forge a new consensus about US role in the world. That will require engaging with those who disagree to rebuild and reaffirm a bipartisan foreign policy consensus based on the lessons of history. America and the world are more secure, free and prosperous when America is prepared to lead. History may repeat itself, but only if we allow it.

— Washington Post

Joseph I. Lieberman, an independent Democrat, is a former senator from Connecticut. Jon Kyl, a Republican, is a former senator from Arizona. They co-chair the American Enterprise Institute’s American Internationalism Project.