A tectonic shift in Pakistan

A week ago, I wrote in this space that the year 2007 saw the first big challenge to Pervez Musharraf's autocratic rule while the current year would be remembered for a decisive battle between him and the democratic forces ascendant since the general election of February 18, 2008. I also pointed out that Musharraf had become the first Pakistani head of state to face the threat of impeachment and that too by a large majority.

As a matter of fact, the Musharraf regime always looked stronger from outside than from inside. Once he had signed on for the American wars in the region, the West built him into a colossus against global terrorism.

Within the country, the ubiquitous system he created with the help of thousands of serving and retired military officers was much feared - for a time - but never accepted. He could have bridged the gulf between him and the people by holding a free and fair election. Instead he alienated them by waging a relentless war against the mainstream political parties. Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister dismissed in the initial Musharraf coup was first sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and then sent into a long exile in Saudi Arabia. Benazir Bhutto spent the Musharraf years abroad and came back only to be assassinated by unknown assailants. As political parties were wantonly decimated, the regime acquired the aura of limitless power.

Without the assent of the people, this power was, however, hollow. Unable to challenge a military government upfront, the people withheld legitimacy. The first serious setback to the regime took place when, fearful of holding an election, Musharraf fell back upon the hackneyed device of a rigged referendum on April 30, 2000 to validate his take-over. The people of Pakistan simply stayed away from the polling booths making it a non-event.

Seminal

This failure was seminal as it led to Musharraf opting for an iron-clad hardcore military regime behind a flimsy civilian façade. Borrowing from Augusto Pinochet, Suharto and Slobodan Milosevic and drawing inspiration from the perpetual interventionism of the Turkish armed forces, the regime now sought legitimacy in economic growth. Turkey was a poor analogy as the Kemalist tradition and Mohammad Ali Jinnah's unwavering faith in parliamentary democracy were but two different streams of political thought. Despite its close ties with the West, Turkey is fiercely nationalistic and its armed forces have a proud record of defending Turkey's national interest.

Musharraf's formula was a trifle different: Pakistan would fight the terrorists, receive large compensation from the United States and reorganise its economy on neoliberal lines favoured by the West. Anchored in this international arrangement, the regime would be able to sideline national political forces. The illusion of limitless empowerment by the West inevitably led to hubris and the use of avoidable force in dealing with political issues, such as a militant demand for provincial autonomy in Baluchistan which accounts for nearly 40 per cent of Pakistan's total area. The perception that Musharraf ruled Pakistan to protect outside interests turned out to be highly corrosive. This was the root cause of his disconnect with the people.

While the regime was complacent in the belief that it would always be propped up by the army, the popular challenges to yet another presidential term for Musharraf grew. He had failed to establish himself in the political pantheon. From his insecure camp came initiatives such as the removal of the Chief Justice of Pakistan. It led to a tidal wave of national anger. He tried to quell it by declaring emergency and sacking another 60 judges. He got himself re-elected on November 29, 2007 by an electoral college which had all but completed its own life. No wonder it turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. On the eve of the move to impeach him only 29 out of more than 750 members of the provincial assemblies supported him.

Survived

Musharraf may well have survived as a constitutional head of state as the leading political party, the Pakistan People's Party, was willing to explore such an option. The new coalition has continued to be tested by some inherent differences and its governance has yet to reach an optimum level. Musharraf's last mistake was to try to exacerbate these differences. There is little doubt that he secretly hoped to stage another blitzkrieg. But as he started casting around for critical support, he discovered that the army, the judiciary and even his international allies were not willing to stake the stability of the state on what increasingly looked like an individual's lust for power.

It is generally believed in Pakistan that some friendly countries have played a role in saving Pakistan from the wear and tear of a bitter impeachment process by persuading Musharraf to resign. There were important internal forces too that wanted to see an early closure. But the decision to let Musharraf walk away with relative equanimity lacks a national consensus. There will be more tremors and after-shocks of the tectonic shift in Pakistan and the coalition government would have to muster all its material and moral resources to calm things down. The Musharraf era is a cautionary tale: it is easier to destroy the constitutional basis of a modern state than to restore it. Pakistan is still littered with the debris of October 12, 1999 and the cumulative price has been heavy.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan. He currently heads the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.