Opinion | Columnists
'We sought end to war'
In this series, Gulf News is running the transcripts of the 20 formal interrogation sessions and 5 'causal conversations' Saddam Hussain had with a senior FBI agent.
- Agencies
- Published: 23:01 July 27, 2009
- Image Credit: Los Angeles Times
- Kuwaiti officials inspect Kuwait Oil Company facilities destroyed by the retreating Iraqi army during the Gulf War in 1991.
In this series, Gulf News is running the transcripts of the 20 formal interrogation sessions and 5 'causal conversations' Saddam Hussain had with a senior FBI agent.
In the 13th session, Saddam disputed claims about the war damage in Kuwait and prisoners of war.
Session 13
March 11, 2004
Baghdad Operations Centre
Interview conducted by George L. Piro
Saddam Hussain (High Value Detainee No 1) was interviewed on March 11, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Saddam provided the following information:
Prior to the start of the interview, Saddam was informed this session would be a continuation of the previous discussions regarding Kuwait.
Regarding information from the Kuwaiti government indicating that the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait caused $180 billion (Dh660.5 billion) in damages to the country, Saddam asked for the source of this information.
When told the source was Kuwait, Saddam asked which neutral and legal entity had questioned Kuwait regarding the basis of its conclusion.
He opined that "no one" asked Kuwait for the details of their investigation of this matter. Saddam again questioned the existence of evidence supporting these Kuwaiti assertions.
Saddam reiterated information provided in a previous interview stating, "Kuwait is Iraqi". According to Saddam, Kuwait was "stolen" from Iraq by a British resolution.
He added that if Kuwait had not been a country with oil, it would not have been "stolen". Saddam stated that the arrogance of the Kuwaiti rulers made them "stupid" and ignited the war.
He further stated that he understood that the United States, located across the Atlantic Ocean, would want Iraq to be poor. However, he cannot understand how Kuwait would want to exist next to a "hungry country".
Saddam emphasised that he is not saying that Kuwait did not have the right to make these statements. He however again sought to question the identity of the neutral entity which examined this matter and whether such information had been discussed with Iraq.
Saddam suggested that an authority similar to a court should have been formed to hear the details from both sides and to decide this matter. However, this did not happen, he said.
Saddam stated that just prior to the war, American officials had said that all Iraqi debts would be waived including monies owed to Kuwait. In his opinion, this proved any amount reportedly owed to Kuwait was not a legal debt and was a "political" matter.
He added that this policy was driven by the United States and not the United Nations (UN), Kuwait, or any other entity.
The interviewer told Saddam that Kuwait never asked for compensation for the damages suffered during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kuwait did, however, ask for the return of 605 prisoners of war (PoWs).
To date, these PoWs have not been returned. Saddam stated these Kuwaitis were not "captives" and are missing as characterised by a UN resolution.
He stated that many "stories and novels have been woven" around this issue, similar to the matter of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The Kuwaiti PoW accusations have been proven to be false, however, just like the WMD rumours, he said.
Saddam stated that individuals often go "missing" during a war. He provided as examples the one coalition individual still missing from the first Gulf War and the thousands of Iraqis and Iranians missing from the war between the two countries.
As for the 605 Kuwaitis, Saddam stated that Kuwait was aware of their fate. He denied any knowledge that the 605 Kuwaitis were captured in circumstances other than combat after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Saddam acknowledged that Aziz Saleh Al Nurnan was governor of Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation. As such, he reported directly to the Iraqi Minister of Interior, a position held by Ali Hasan Al Majid at that time.
Al Numan's duties as governor were set forth in Iraqi provincial laws. Saddam said he did not remember whether Al Numan was appointed by him or by decree of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
In Iraq, the constitution sets forth the authority of the RCC and the president, who is also the chairman of the RCC. Some governmental appointments such as positions accorded to high-ranking officers in the military, judges and general directors are based on a "republican" directive, he said.
Saddam explained that the Iraqi system does not prevent the president from submitting a name for consideration of appointment and requesting subsequent feedback from the RCC.
Decisions in Iraq are signed by the president. It is his prerogative to consult or not to consult anyone. Saddam stated "his style" was to always consult with others when the time came to make a decision.
Governors were assigned based on a "republican" or presidential directive. He said he did not remember if he discussed the appointment of Al Numan with the RCC .
When questioned regarding Iraq's usage of Kuwaitis, Japanese and Westerners as human shields during the first Gulf War including the positioning of them at key sites such as communications centres and military positions, Saddam denied that such individuals were taken to Iraqi military positions.
He added that the Iraqi government did not, however, prevent individuals from volunteering as human shields to protect facilities such as communications centres. When questioned whether such volunteers existed in 1991, Saddam replied, "I do not remember."
The translator read to Saddam an Iraqi government communication from Qusay Hussain, his son, concerning the usage of Kuwaiti prisoners as human shields to which he replied that he had no information about the letter.
When pointed out that the document was recovered by American forces from an Iraqi government building and is deemed legitimate, he stated, "I answered."
He asked whether the captives discussed in this communication were ever questioned about being held in Iraqi captivity or being used as human shields. He asserted that Iraq released all the Kuwaiti captives.
Upon being told that the document was dated March 14, 2003, he said, "It is a forgery. It is impossible."
He suggested that the communication should be examined closely to determine authenticity and that he had thought it was dated 1991.
Saddam stated that if the date of the document was indeed 2003, it was a case of forgery. He added that Iraq had not been holding any captives at that time.
He stated that Qusay was not the typ e of person to "make up things". He reiterated that experts in the United States and in Iraq should scrutinise this document for authenticity.
Regarding chemical weapons and why Iraq did not use them in the first Gulf War, he replied that he had been asked this question previously and had answered it.
When pointed out to him that the interviewer had not previously asked this question, he replied that he believed it was strange that the interviewer or anyone else would ask this question, not just at this point but at any time.
He stated that it is not Iraqi policy to use chemical weapons against coalition forces. He commented that this was a discussion of history, not unrealistic hypotheticals.
He asked how Iraq would have been described if it had used chemical weapons. He then replied to his own question, "We would have been called stupid."
According to Saddam, chemical weapons, and their use, were never discussed by Iraqi officials before or during the 1991 war.
As stated during a previous interview, Saddam acknowledged a meeting in January, 1991, just before the war, between US secretary of state James Baker and Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz.
He recalled a statement by Baker to "take Iraq back to the pre-industrial age." He stated that Iraq would not be intimidated by threats, however, especially when coming from someone in "a strong position".
Saddam denied knowledge that part of this discussion concerned the position of the United States regarding Iraq's possible use of chemical weapons should hostilities occur.
According to him, "We decided the right thing to do." He stated that the use of chemical weapons did not "cross our mind".
Saddam stated that Sultan Hashem, Iraqi minister of defence, and Saleh, Second Corps commander, represented Iraq at the ceasefire talks during the first Gulf War.
Their positions and viewpoints were the same as those of the Iraqi leadership, to secure a ceasefire and to start the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq.
Saddam stated Iraq had no goal of continuing the war and desired a ceasefire.
When questioned about other issues discussed by Iraq at the 1991 ceasefire talks, Saddam stated that he did not remember any additional Iraqi requests other than the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory.
In his opinion, the fighting would have continued without this withdrawal. He denied knowledge that Iraq asked for, and received, permission to continue flying helicopters. He further denied knowledge of the purpose of such an Iraqi request.
Shortly after his arrest in December 2003, former Iraqi president Saddam Hussain was interrogated by the FBI. The secret interrogation documents, which were made public only recently by the National Security Archive, an independent non-governmental research institute in the US, shed light on the state of mind of Saddam, executed in December 2006.
THE FBI INTERVIEWS
AFP
Final journey
Relatives of Kuwaiti prisoners of war, whose remains were found in a mass grave in southern Iraq, carry their coffins to the cemetery in Kuwait City on July 9, 2003. Kuwaiti authorities said they had received complaints about 605 people who had disappeared in the wake of Iraq's invasion.
Los Angeles Times
After the war
Kuwaiti officials inspect Kuwait Oil Company facilities destroyed by the retreating Iraqi army during the Gulf War in 1991.
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