The imminence of war is an illusion

Shortly after the Israel Defence Forces claimed that it had captured a ship allegedly filled with Iranian weapons meant for the Hezbollah, Israeli Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi said Hezbollah had rockets with a 320-kilometre range that could reach into the Israeli heartland.

On November 11, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah corrected him, saying that all of Israel, not only its south, was within the range of Hezbollah rockets — raising fears that a new confrontation could soon break out along the Lebanese-Israeli border. A closer look, however, proves that it was not as imminent as it may seem. Simply put: Israel is not ready, the US is not enthusiastic and international heavyweights, like Saudi Arabia and Russia, would not allow it.

Over the past two years, Israel has been violating international law with repeated over-flights above Lebanon and sending espionage cells into Lebanese territory, including listening devices into the south last October. According to the UN, both sides "remain committed to full implementation" of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that repeated violations across the border highlight how fragile the situation is, raising fears that it could deteriorate any minute.

Sources close to Hezbollah confirm that the Lebanese party is busy reinforcing fixed defence positions north of the Litani River, protecting the routes to Beirut and the Beka'a Valley, claiming that if war is to break out, Hezbollah is prepared not only to fight back, as it did in 2006, but to delve deep into northern Israel, capturing Jewish colonies along the border. If that happens, they add, this would certainly bring down the Netanyahu government. The ground would be too soft for Israeli tanks to venture this winter, sources add, pushing the likelihood of a confrontation to next spring.

Impediments

There are natural obstacles to a new round of battle between Hezbollah and Israel. One is the presence of UN peacekeeping forces along the border, who had their mandate renewed earlier this year, along with a lack of a proper pretext for the Israelis to strike at Hezbollah, which has been observing 1701. Israel can, of course, use the ship affair to justify striking at Lebanon once again, although it is difficult to see what that would achieve, except set the region ablaze — drowning all the moderation brought around by Barack Obama.

Israel, however, realises that it cannot bomb Hezbollah out of existence. Far from eliminating Hezbollah, such a war, were it to break out, would be targeted at Iran more than Lebanon. The Lebanese party, despite all attempts, is still firmly united and has not been infiltrated by Israeli spies. Had this been the case, then Israel would have managed to penetrate them long ago. Let us not forget that for years, the only kind of intelligence both countries got on Iran was from various unreliable sources: Iranians in the Diaspora loyal to the Shah, Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussain and Lebanese proxies like the "South Lebanon Army". None of them knew for sure how powerful the Iranian giant really was. Real intelligence, after all, is always gathered by embassies — which are official channels of espionage, recognised by the international community since the 16th century. The US and Israel have not had embassies in Iran since 1979.

The only logical explanation for such a war would be to test the pulse of the Iranians, preparing for a Plan B in case Obama's engagement hit a brick wall with Tehran. Obama, for that matter, is not too enthusiastic about a non-state player in the Middle East, over which he has absolutely no control. He would not mind an assault that breaks or weakens Hezbollah to prevent the snowballing of non-state players modelled after Hezbollah.

Not now, however. Not before Obama delivers on the Middle East process and gets his domestic house in order.

One suggestion on how to deal with Hezbollah is to lure them into power, as was the case with Hamas after 2006, and Fatah, before them, after Oslo. Only when they capture the state will they cease to operate as a state-within-a-state, where they will be eager to be recognised by the international community as statesmen rather than guerrilla leaders. Nasrallah personally is very aware of this danger and insists that Hezbollah wants to hold on to both sides of the stick — assume their respected allocation in the Lebanese system, while maintaining their arms and right to fight the Israelis. He realises very well that power corrupts and this explains why in the newly-born Lebanese cabinet, Hezbollah has no more than two technical portfolios — agriculture and administrative reforms. Since the option of taming Hezbollah through power does not stand for now, the world is clueless on how to deal with Hezbollah. Politically, they remain as powerful as ever, having managed to dictate all of their demands.

The will for war is therefore present, although the logistics of such a war and the logic behind it remain very abstract and difficult to justify for the Israelis. And so long as dialogue is still ongoing — no matter how sluggishly — between the US and Iran, war is probably not in the immediate horizon between Lebanon and Israel.

Sami Moubayed is the editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine.