The gun, fatwa and vote

The key question in every political system is: who has the final say? Since the fall of Saddam Hussain five years ago, the question has been posed, and, for most Iraqis answered, with clarity: since power belongs to the people, the final word must come from their freely elected representatives through constitutional institutions.

All this might sound like a mouthful. However, it is really quite simple.

During the decades of despotism that led Iraq into one tragedy after another, a single individual had the final say. In that system, power belonged to one who could master enough force to impose his will on others through violence.

In the neighbouring Islamic Republic in Iran, the last word is reserved for the "Supreme Guide", who claims divine mandate in a system known as Walayat Al Faqih.

Translated as "The Custodianship of the Jurisconsult", it might sound impressive.

It is not. Stripped of its pompous label, the system means rule by a single mullah who is supposed to have even the right to suspend the basic rules of Islam when necessary. The entire population of Iran, some 75 million souls, are treated as children or mentally imbalanced individuals who need a protector.

For the past five years, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis have taken risks to show that they do not wish to return to one-man rule.

Defying death threats and ignoring the hardship of daily life, they have come forward to vote in growing numbers in one referendum and election after another.

Having rejected secular despotism, do the Iraqis desire to import Walayat Al Faqih from Iran?

Moqtada Al Sadr, the youthful cleric who is once again in the headlines, not always for the right reasons, seems to think so.

With the failure of his Iranian patrons' bid to seize control of Basra in the name of the Jaish Al Mahdi (Mahdi's Army) or JAM last month, the maverick mullah has proposed a formula that could lead to Walayat Al Faqih in Iraq.

He says he has written to senior ayatollahs in Najaf and Qom, in Iran, seeking fatwas with regard to the fate of Jaish Al Mahdi. If the ayatollahs rule that JAM must disband, it will, Al Sadr promises. If, on the contrary, they rule that it should stick around, it will, keeping its illegal weapons. Al Sadr's move is clearly designed to undermine Iraq's still fragile democracy.

What he is saying in effect is this: as far as I am concerned, all those millions who voted and the institutions they created count for nothing. The fate of Iraq must not be set by Iraqi people, let alone their elected leaders, but by a handful of mullahs, most of whom are not even citizens of the country.

The fact that Al Sadr has included the mullahs of Qom, including two of his teachers, shows that he does not regard Iraq as a sovereign state whose affairs ought to be decided within its own borders.

In the Khomeinist system, "Supreme Guide" Ali Khamenei is designated as "Leader of the Islamic Ummah" as a whole. One must assume that the Qom mullahs Al Sadr has written to would not issue a fatwa on Iraq without clearing it with their "Supreme Guide". This means that Al Sadr is trying to transform Iraq into a de facto province of the Islamic Republic, just as Hassan Nasrallah and his associates are seeking a similar fate for Lebanon.

Al Sadr may argue that such concepts as nation-state, democracy and constitutional rule are Western inventions not binding on Muslims. However, most Iraqis do not wish to be ruled by mullahs even in Najaf, let alone Qom and Tehran.

Implicate

It is possible that Al Sadr decided to implicate the ayatollahs because he no longer controls JAM. Having spent the past 10 months mostly in Tehran and Qom, Al Sadr has seen control of JAM slip away into the hands of its Iranian paymasters.

The recent battle in Basra showed that JAM was just one tool in the hands of the Quds Force, a unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in charge of "exporting" the Khomeinist revolution.

Al Sadr's efforts to bring in the ayatollahs may be his way of trying to distance JAM from the IRGC without picking an open quarrel with Tehran. However, even if that theory were true, Al Sadr's move remains inexcusable. In a sense, he has insulted his electorate, the 11 per cent of the Iraqi voters who helped 30 of his candidates find seats in the National Assembly.

Al Sadr may be trying to replicate the Lebanese Hezbollah that wants its bread buttered on both sides, having seats in the parliament and the Council of Ministers while maintaining a private army financed by a foreign power.

By the time this column was taking shape, none of the ayatollahs had responded to Sadr's letters. Let's hope none will.

The Iraqi parliament has decided to disband the militias and its writ must be obeyed. Any attempt by the ayatollahs to second-guess the parliament and the Council of Ministers could provoke a crisis that would harm Iraq.

There is no harm in ayatollahs expressing their views on all issues, including political ones. Such expressions, however, should be part of a broader national debate in the context of an open society. Once the parliament has enacted a law, no fatwa could overrule it. Citizens could challenge the law through the judiciary, including the Constitutional Court, in accordance with established procedure.

In rule by fiat, a single despot exercises power. In rule by the gun, a few thousand militiamen and other criminals project power through violence. In rule by fatwa, half a dozen mullahs claim the power of life and death over a whole nation. It is only in a system based on free elections that everyone has a share of power.

Iraq has said goodbye to rule by fiat and is in no mood to succumb to rule by fatwa. The militias must be disarmed so that the new Iraqi state can continue to grow. Young Moqtada who appears keen to have a political future in his native land should understand that.

Amir Taheri is an Iranian writer based in Europe.