When a faction of Pakistan’s Taliban militants broke ranks last week with their central leadership and set the pace for a potentially bloody fight with Pakistani forces, the event promised to cut both ways for the country’s vital interests.
On the one hand, a split within the Taliban shows cracks that could widen in days to come, underlining a key opportunity for promoting Pakistan’s vital interests. For months, many in Pakistan have hoped for a split that will divide the Taliban and erode their ability to fight as a strong, unified force.
But on the other hand, the split could also confront Pakistan’s ruling structure with a bigger challenge if a new group of dissidents enlarges its ranks and becomes a more formidable military force. At a time when divisions within Pakistan show signs of sharpening further, a reinvigorated militant force will indeed be highly undesirable for Islamabad’s best national interests.
On Friday, a pamphlet distributed on behalf of Taliban’s militant commander Gul Bahadar in the north Waziristan region formally revoked an earlier peace accord with the government.
At the same time, the Taliban showed signs of an increasingly determined push to escalate the fight. Reports from the area suggested that the militants ordered ordinary residents to leave the region by June 10, indicating a potentially bloody conflict likely to take place thereafter. However, going by well known precedents, a fight, if it comes, will likely spill over to some of Pakistan’s larger urban areas in a repeat of a Taliban backlash in the shape of suicide and bomb attacks.
There are at least two competing challenges for Pakistan’s ruling structure. First, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s backing for a controversial peace process with the Taliban over the past many months clearly lies in tatters.
There is just no hope left for a negotiated settlement to end the bloodiest internal conflict in Pakistan’s history. A subsequent question, however, is harder to tackle. Can Sharif rise to the occasion and deal with a significant blowback that will come in the shape of retaliatory terrorist attacks?
To that compelling question, the answer must broadly be in the non-affirmative. A year after returning to Islamabad for the third time as prime minister, Sharif has shown virtually no progress by way of overseeing a comprehensive new national security policy that also brings Pakistan’s mainstream onboard. In sharp contrast to the need for lawmakers in Islamabad to lead from the front, the norm has wavered between knee-jerk reactions to specific terrorist events and complacency.
While legislation to deal with the terrorist onslaught was conveniently ignored, the government has gone after one controversial, pipedream project after another in a clear indication of where its priorities ultimately lie.
Sharif’s long known passion of overseeing communication networks has seen his ruling Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz (PML-N) pursue ill-advised projects like a deeply controversial bridge linking Islamabad to its suburb city of Rawalpindi, to be used by fancy government approved buses.
Train projects
Other similar ventures include plans for an urban train project for Sharif’s home city of Lahore or a train project from Islamabad to the mountainous resort of Murree and further afield to the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.
Ironically, though, these projects, which have been described as wasteful by many, will simply not help Pakistan deal with matters like internal insecurity or indeed the crisis surrounding the country’s electricity-starved neighbourhoods.
The other challenge faced by Sharif is also no less acute. He appears to have taken up a fight with the Pakistan army on matters ranging from the future of former general Pervez Musharraf to having agreement on how best to tackle the terrorist onslaught. Musharraf, the prime minister’s former nemesis who replaced Sharif in a 1999 military coup, appears to remain the target of Sharif’s wrath.
The government’s apparent refusal to allow Musharraf to travel outside Pakistan following a recent indictment is widely seen as an act of revenge. But the fallout from Sharif’s management of the issue is finally seen to have raised the level of tensions surrounding Pakistan’s civil-military relations. It would be unrealistic to expect the rank and file of the Pakistan army to keep a determined push in a bloody fight with the Taliban as a former army chief is kept in the dock.
Stoning case
Perhaps an eye-opening event also came in the past week, which deeply underlined the seriousness of the challenge faced by the Pakistani state and the ruling structure’s inability to deal with it.
In the central part of Lahore, Sharif’s home town, a woman in her mid 20s was practically stoned to death by members of her paternal family, just outside the premises of the provincial high court, for choosing to marry against their choice. The incident obviously appalled many within and outside the country.
Yet, the government’s increasingly dubious credentials to deal with the lawlessness came to light when it was reported that the killing took place in close sight of a group of policemen standing nearby. Sharif chose to order an investigation, but only two days later and just when a key UN official joined international condemnation of the event. Going by precedents in Pakistan, it is hard to imagine that the investigation will lead to justice for the victim or her dependents left behind.
While embarrassing for Sharif, the killing in Lahore has further underlined the importance of taking Pakistan’s army on board. The formidable question, however, is just one: Can Sharif lead from the front even as the Taliban show signs of cracking up?
Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.