Russia uses Georgia to revive realpolitik

As billions watched China stake its claim to being the 21st century's leading power, with a stunning opening ceremony at the Beijing Olympics, its former Cold War partner was pursuing its own ambitions in an altogether more traditional way.

Russia's brutal demonstration of power in South Ossetia, a breakaway region of its southern neighbour Georgia, marks the latest - and most alarming - sign of the Kremlin's determination to reclaim control over former Soviet states.

These former satellites have now been left in no doubt that Russia must be regarded as glavniy, or number one, if they wish to avoid the fate of Georgia. Central to Vladimir Putin's nationalistic policy is a conviction that the power of the West - seemingly unassailable at the end of the Cold War -is on the wane.

The current crisis demonstrates that the Cold War has not been replaced by common values between East and West, but by the revival of hard Realpolitik.

Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia's President, might have been profoundly unwise to employ massive force against the pro-Russian separatists in South Ossetia last Thursday, but his lapses of judgement are not the point.

The commanders of Russian forces and their political masters in the Kremlin hoped he would behave exactly as he did.

The episode is a perfect application of what Russian military scientists call "reflexive control'': the defeat of an adversary through his own efforts. It is also an application of Clausewitz's maxim that war is a tool of policy.

The aim of Russia's policy, succinctly expressed in 1992, is to "be leader of stability and security on the entire territory of the former USSR''.

As Yeltsin declared to Russia's intelligence services in 1994, "global ideological confrontation has been replaced by a struggle for spheres of interest in geopolitics''. Back then, Russia had little to struggle with. Today, that is no longer the case.

Irreparably damaged

If Western interests are not to be irreparably damaged, we will need to understand that they are being tested on three overlapping levels: local, regional and global.

Georgia is not just a square on a chessboard, but a country that is extremely important in its own right. For two reasons, the West cannot be indifferent to what happens there.

First, despite the uncultivated instincts of its president, Georgia's political culture is fundamentally democratic, its people (80 per cent of whom support Nato membership) profoundly pro-Western, and its sense of national identity almost indestructible.

Georgia can be defeated by Russia, but it can no longer submit to it, and therefore war between Georgia and Russia would be a frightening prospect even if no wider interests existed.

Second, the only energy pipeline in the former USSR independent of Russian control passes through Georgia. There will be no meaningful energy security, let alone diversification of energy supplies, if these pipelines become vulnerable to sabotage, like those in Iraq, or to takeover by shadow businesses fronting for Russian interests.

But Georgia is equally important to Russia. Russia has only controlled the nationalities of the north Caucasus when it has dominated the south Caucasus. Despite the so-called "normalisation'' in Chechnya, the north Caucasus remains, to Russia's leaders, the Achilles heel of the Russian Federation.

Russia's determination to hold sway in South Ossetia and Abkhazia must be seen in this light. But it also serves another purpose: as a means to deny Georgia admission to Nato.

In their own right, these territories mean far less to Russia than they do to Georgia. So long as this is the case, Georgia risks finding itself hostage to Russian intentions, and so for that matter do the OSCE and Nato. And so Russia would like everyone to think.

The need to focus on is what is at stake. Is the West's relationship with Russia the most important issue? If so, what happens to that relationship if the West demonstrate that brutality works and that "zones of interest'' can be formed against the interests of the countries that reside in them?

What happens to the West's wider scheme of interests in Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea and Caspian regions? Today, those questions are now being asked. But it is late to be asking them.

James Sherr is head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House.