With crisis comes opportunity: Iraq’s Kurdistan region could hold a referendum for independence within months, according to its president, Masoud Barzani. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) and its takeover of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartlands means the Kurds now have the opportunity to maximise on turmoil in Arab Iraq and achieve what almost every Kurd has always dreamed of: A state of their own.
Historically, the Kurds have suffered massacres and genocide at the hands of successive Iraqi regimes. They have been oppressed by their neighbours and, after the First World War, had statehood taken away from them. Isil’s takeover of Iraq’s Sunni north means the Kurds can now go for it. They have the chance to remedy past mistakes as well as fulfil long-standing objectives aimed at protecting the Kurdish people from external threats and, further down the line, establishing an independent Kurdish state. Turmoil in Arab Iraq means Kurdistan is unlikely to have to deal with a militarily confrontational Baghdad government, at least not any time soon. Baghdad’s armed forces have been pushed to the south and their capacity dramatically reduced, as portrayed by their reliance on Shiite militias. Those militias operate independently of the state and lack the capacity to deal with both the revitalised Sunni insurgency as well as Kurdistan’s effective armed forces, known as the Peshmerga.
The future of Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves lies in the hands of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Over the past 10 years, the federal government in Baghdad has either withdrawn or reduced the Kurds’ entitlement to the Iraqi national budget, but Kirkuk is an opportunity to eliminate Baghdad’s capacity to shackle the Kurds through punitive economic measures.
Kurdistan may have won a historic battle for what has been described as both the crown jewel and Jerusalem of Kurdistan. It can now secure its economic independence from Baghdad. Control of Kirkuk also means the Kurds have the economic lynchpin for an independent state, should that be a desired option in the future.
Arab Iraq may still try to retake the province, but it is too focused on turning Baghdad and the Shiite south into a fortress. Its preoccupation with Isil and the broader Sunni insurgency means that, at best, Arab Iraq can hope the Kurds will still settle the status of Kirkuk through Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which provides for a referendum on the status of the province. That would be wishful, as well as futile, thinking. Baghdad not only has a weakened hand, but the demographics in the province and realities on the ground considerably favour the Kurds.
Some may argue that the Kurds no longer share a border with an internationally recognised sovereign state, but with a dangerous coalition of jihadists and unpleasant Sunni militant forces. That misses the bigger picture. The Sunni insurgency is occupied with powerful Shiite enemies to the south; their resources are limited; they are divided among themselves and they lack the capacity to fight the experienced Peshmerga. Furthermore, Baghdad was never really in control of the Sunni Arab heartlands that border Kurdistan. Long before recent events, those heartlands constituted a safe haven for militants and jihadist groups. The threat is real, but nothing new for the Kurds.
Although today Isil and its allies enjoy greater autonomy and resources, there is no reason why the Kurds cannot match their emboldened status by investing in their armed forces and security services.
Kurdistan is no longer an isolated nation. It shares economic and geostrategic interests with powerful neighbours like Turkey and Iran. Ankara and Tehran both fear the rise of jihadists and Sunni militants — both can find common ground with the Kurds. They would prefer a rich, tried and trusted partner on their borders that possesses the capacity to confront a common enemy that significantly threatens their interests. A weaker Kurdistan only emboldens this common enemy.
With the support of regional powers, the Kurds could become powerful regional actors. Along with the broader international community, regional players should support the Kurds through enhanced military hardware and equipment, as well as political and diplomatic support. The Kurds have vast energy resources that they need help in exporting and the region needs a strategic and capable participant in the expanding battle against extremism.
Helping the Kurds fulfil the opportunity presented by Iraq’s crisis — aimed at protecting Kurdistan’s borders — to bring them into the battle against Sunni militants in the longer run and create a stable regional partner means the crisis in Iraq can become an opportunity.
— Guardian News & Media Ltd
Ranj Alaaldin is a doctoral researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he focuses on Iraq and sectarian conflict in the Middle East.