Opinion | Columnists
How Pakistan can rein in the Taliban
Focusing on socio-economic engagement over excess use of brute force is a precondition for accomplishing victory.
- By Haider Ali Hussain Mullick, Special to Gulf News
- Published: 00:05 April 7, 2008
- Image Credit: Illustration: Nino Jose Heredia/Gulf News
Last week when the US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher met with Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister and the chief supporter of the new civilian government in Pakistan, hard talk on US-Pakistan cooperation on the "war on terror" dominated the agenda.
Pakistanis were no longer interested in supporting "America's War" through its proxy, President General (retired) Pervez Musharraf, chided Sharif. Furthermore, Pakistan's civilian government would no longer take dictates from its military. It was time for the civilian politicians to take the driver's seat in drafting and implementing Pakistan's national security policy.
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's government faces a myriad of socio-economic problems made worse by rising suicide bombings. The United States administration is equally anxious about its estranged, nuclear-armed ally facing the arduous task of eradicating Al Qaida and the Pakistani Taliban.
Given the electoral loss of Islamists in insurgency strongholds in northern Pakistan, Pakistani civilian and military leaders, backed by the United States, have an excellent opening to go beyond short-lived counterterrorism tactics to a multifaceted sustainable counterinsurgency strategy.
Contrary to Washington's misinformed dismal report card on Islamabad's halfhearted efforts to curb terrorism, however, the Pakistani military did achieve major successes in the early years after 9/11.
Nearly half of Guantanamo Bay Prison is full of Al Qaida operatives caught in Pakistan, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, the chief plotter of 9/11. But selective treatment of the Taliban in hopes of finding a political solution, a reduction in human intelligence, and a failure to 'sell' the war to the Pakistani people have overshadowed prior victories.
In an attempt to remedy the situation, last fall General Ashfaq Kiyani, former head of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and current Chief of Army Staff, implemented a new guarded yet effective counterinsurgency strategy. General Kiyani was able to bring Swat - a former Al Qaida stronghold in northern Pakistan - under Islamabad's control.
When it comes to eradicating terrorist hideouts and training camps Pakistani civilian leaders seem just as dedicated as their military counterparts.
Despite constitutional differences with the president, the Pakistan Peoples Party, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), and the Awami National Party agree that terrorism is a complex, multidimensional threat and not simply Musharraf's bogeyman that would disappear if Pakistan severed its ties with the United States.
Nonetheless, they also believe that Musharraf's prior connivance in supporting a US-centric counterterrorism strategy was detrimental to Pakistan's long-term stability.
Novel approach
Gilani's government could not agree more. In addition to General Kiyani's novel approach, his recent presentation on the military's actions against the terrorists to Gilani's cabinet, and the next government's desire to 'talk' to moderate Taliban, more must be done to conduct a successful counterinsurgency.
First, before hurriedly signing another truce with the 'moderate Taliban' in the tribal areas, the new government must investigate past breakdowns of similar agreements.
Second, actions that promise better governance, more constitutional autonomy - such as the abolishment of the Frontier Crimes Regulations and extension of the Political Parties Act - and economic development opportunities to the tribal areas pending expulsion of terrorists will only succeed if Pakistani politicians guarantee consistent engagement.
That includes, for example, asking the military to support Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) - similar to International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) role in Afghanistan - over large-scale military operations.
Third, the current US plan to increase the training of Pakistani troops is a step in the right direction. US training programmes must be supplemented by US military hardware and intelligence exchange across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
A unilateral US attack on Pakistan's rustic tribal areas, however, will be devastatingly unsustainable and counterproductive.
A stable nuclear-armed Pakistan is crucial for any winning US effort to bring stability to the region. With time running out, Washington should continue providing smart and targeted military, economic and diplomatic aid to all willing and capable Pakistani civilian and military leaders and institutions.
Altering the counterterrorism-counterinsurgency calculus by focusing on active socio-economic engagement over excess use of brute force is a precondition for accomplishing victory in the global "war on terror".
Haider Ali Hussain Mullick is an independent policy analyst, and an Adjunct Fellow at Spearhead Research, Lahore, Pakistan. He researches American foreign policy towards South Asia.
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