Hamas brought about its own downfall

Hamas as we knew it died a long time ago, back in January 2006. The selfless Hamas, interested in nothing but liberation and justice for the Palestinians, committed political suicide when it decided to abandon the bullet in favour of the ballot.

After many years in the resistance, and tired of the hard life, these kinds of groups usually go for the new, flashy title and comfortable lifestyle. It happened with the National Bloc of Syria, whose leaders liberated their country from the French in 1946, only to be ejected with little respect or ceremony by a military coup d'etat (because of their errors while in power) in 1949.

It happened to Fatah itself, whose leaders enchanted the world with their heroism in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, only to become as corrupt as some of their counterparts in the 1990s after Oslo.

The mistakes of Fatah led to their humiliating defeat in the legislative elections of 2006. It is in the process of happening with Hezbollah, whose leaders want the best of all possible worlds; the titles of both freedom fighter and statesmen. The minute all these parties became immersed in the dirty game of politics, they were no longer utopian heroes but rather ordinary politicians who are subject to ridicule, hatred, and often very harsh criticism.

Hamas knew all of that, but it went ahead with its political programme in 2006, promising the Palestinians an end to corruption, higher wages, more jobs and social equality. These slogans, coming from credible politicians with an until then unblemished record, revealed the weaknesses of post-Arafat Fatah. Then reality sank in. Life in government was not so easy after all, and the dirty game of politics required tactics that the leaders of Hamas simply could not do.

Keeping their posts was seemingly more important to them than the ordinary Palestinian citizen who was paying a high price for their views. To be fair, we must acknowledge that Hamas was maltreated by the Arabs and the international community, especially the US, due to the embargo imposed on the Occupied Territories since January 2006. They were not given a chance to prove themselves. But life is not fair, especially in the Middle East. Had they been left to govern in a normal manner, then results would have judged Hamas fairly. In a democratic system, if Hamas performs well in power, it gets to keep its parliamentary majority. If it does not, it fails in the next parliamentary elections. It's that simple.

The example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan speaks volumes about how to deal with Islamic movements. The late King Hussain realised that the Muslim Brotherhood was becoming too strong in Jordanian society, and threatening him with the overwhelming popularity they had in the Jordanian street. That was because they were untried in government, the King reasoned. Rather than suppress them, he permitted them to run for parliament. Once in power, they were automatically ruined because they were no longer able to deliver. If Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had the courage and vision of King Hussain, he should have courted Hamas in anticipation of its downfall in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Clear

If one goes back to the statements of Hamas during the early weeks of their victory, it is very clear that they were trying to come across as statesmen. By actually joining the political process, they were legitimising the Oslo Accords. This is especially clear with the local leadership: men such as Esmail Haniya who wanted to pay wages, find jobs and run a state. That was not the case, however, with exiled leaders such as Khaleed Mesha'al, who would have preferred a non-governmental Hamas that was free to do what it does best: wage war against Israel.

Mesha'al realised early on that Hamas had lost on both fronts when it came to power in 2006. It could no longer wage war, because of the limits of government office and the need to be accepted by the international community. And its leaders could also never stand as credible statesmen because of their views, history and Islamic ideology. The embargo, along with the provocations of Fatah, were what led to the blood circus in Gaza in June 2006. Hamas behaved like a wild animal when it launched a coup against Fatah, storming the city, insulting the symbols of Palestinian statehood and declaring its authority over the Gaza Strip. That was a mistake. But the manner in which Abbas dealt with the crisis was also a mistake.

Hamas will not disappear only because it has been outlawed by Abbas and criticised by his Arab counterparts. The appointment of Salam Fayyad as prime minister, against the wishes of Hamas, will not end the Islamic group's violence. Hamas is a reality - a difficult one - that Abbas must deal with and digest or it will choke him to death. He wants a disarmed Hamas.

Well, it is clear that he won't be able to do it because neither Israel, nor the US, or the UN, or even Arafat were able to disarm the Islamic resistance.

The closest thing we ever had to a disarmed Hamas was the Hamas of January 2006 onwards. It was a Hamas restricted by government office. The only way to prevent Hamas from being a state-within-a-state is to make Hamas the state itself - or part of the state. If they succeed - while observing norms and international agreements such as Oslo, they get to keep the state. If they fail, they will be ejected by the ballot.

Since January 2006 Hamas did not fire a single bullet against Israel. The US - and Israel itself - failed to invest in that and pressured Hamas into becoming more radical, which resulted in: Gaza 2007.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.