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Bush Doctrine: prescription for anarchy
Section 5 [of the National Security Strategy] articulates a shift in US foreign policy from one of deterrence to one of prevention and preemption
The October 26 raid on Syria by US Special Forces continues to generate interest in media and political circles. Last Sunday, the New York Times published a lengthy report, examining the legality and feasibility of such operations.
The paper disclosed a all-known fact that the latest raid into Syria was one in a series of cross-border attacks by the US military since the Iraq war. It attributed these raids to a classified order that former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed in the spring of 2004 with the approval of President George W. Bush. The secret order gave the military new authority to attack the Al Qaida network anywhere in the world, and a more sweeping mandate to conduct operations in countries not at war with the US.
The New York Times must have forgotten that the basis of such raids was set out much earlier. It is part and parcel of the Bush Doctrine, which was outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. The NSS was published approximately one year after the September 11, 2001 attacks and expressed a fundamental reformulation of US foreign policy.
Following its publication and its subsequent enactments, there has been a great deal of debate about section 5 of this document. This section outlines what has come to be known as the doctrine of preemption. At the core of these debates is an age-old dilemma about the circumstances in which the use of force can be justified.
Section 5 articulates a shift in US foreign policy from one of deterrence to one of prevention and preemption. The following are the key points in the Section: Deterrence which no longer work. Imminence must be redefined. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.
Prevention, preemption, and anticipatory self-defence are all viable options: The US has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack.
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the US will, if necessary, act preemptively. The US will no longer just "wait and see". The US will take action before threats materialise. The US cannot remain idle while dangers gather.
An earlier section of the document invokes the possibility of unilateral action. While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right to self-defense by acting preemptively against terrorists.
There are numerous examples of preemptive actions undertaken by the US prior to 2002, contrary to the NSS claim that the US has historically always acted reactively rather than aggressively: 1954 in Guatemala, 1965 in Dominican Republic, 1983 in Grenada, 1998 in Afghanistan and Sudan. One could argue that US policy in Central America throughout the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on the use of various preventive and preemptive tactics by proxy in the struggle to halt the spread of communism.
The latest and most widely-discussed example of preemptive action (though there is a lot of debate on how best to characterise it) is the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The invasion was undertaken initially to preempt the imminent threat from Saddam Hussain's WMD. As has been much noted, the justifications shifted over the course of the conflict, with new justifications replacing old ones when the old ones lost all credibility. With the evaporation of any imminent threat, preemption gave way to prevention: the invasion was a preventive action intended to prevent Saddam Hussain from developing any weapons capacities in the future.
Because the Bush Doctrine collapses preventive, preemptive, and anticipatory modes of action together, the administration has been able to justify whatever actions it has taken, whether we may think these justifications have any merit or not.
Needless to say, the Bush Doctrine is at odds with international norms, which make self-defence acceptable only if an attack is visibly imminent or if it has occurred. More important, by advocating preventive war and preemption, the US head down a slippery slope, creating a precedent by which others could begin to act similarly, and with similar justifications of self-defense, thus leading to a spiral of violence in the world.
In addition, defining war as imminent or inevitable makes it inevitable. If a threat can be identified, even on the flimsiest of evidence, as "about to occur", then the likelihood of violent conflict becomes unacceptably high. The outcome is an endless series of conflicts and wars predicated on perceived threats rather than actual threats.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a lecturer in media and international relations, Faculty of Political Science and Media, Damascus University, Syria.
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