Opinion | Columnists
Baath Party members talked freely, asserts Saddam
I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law or the people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership, but also on the people who conspired."
- Interview conducted by George L. Piro
- Published: 22:54 July 18, 2009
- Image Credit: AP
- Saddam Hussain (near microphone) addresses a crowd in Baghdad on January 27, 1969, after the hanging of 14 Iraqis sentenced to death on charges of spying for Israel.
Shortly after his arrest in December 2003, former Iraqi president Saddam Hussain was interrogated by the FBI. The secret interrogation documents, which were made public only recently by the National Security Archive, an independent non-governmental research institute in the US, shed light on the state of mind of Saddam, executed in December 2006.
In this series, Gulf News will run the transcripts of the 20 formal interrogation sessions and five 'casual conversations' he had with a senior FBI agent. In the sixth session, Saddam talks of the tumultuous 1968 revolution and the role played by Baath party leaders.
- Session 6: February 16, 2004
- Baghdad Operations Centre
- Interview conducted by George L. Piro
I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law or the people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership, but also on the people who conspired."
"As I recall, Bakr ruled until 1979 but was not called a dictator, but after I ruled, they called me a dictator...After 1979, who was killed or assassinated inside or outside of Iraq? Who was executed from the Ministries or out of the leadership after 1979?
"The Baath Party talked freely. This is only a media interpretation that people could not talk."
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"People think what they want. Everyone has his own opinions. People are not a computer. We all have flesh and blood.
Saddam Hussain (High Value Detainee 01) was interviewed on February 16, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Saddam provided the following information:
At the beginning of the interview, Saddam was informed that today's dialogue would be a continuation of the last discussion regarding the years following the 1968 revolution and about prominent members of the Baath party.
The interviewer mentioned to Saddam that he understood that the attempted coup in 1973 was undertaken by a protege of Saddam, Nadim Kazzar, Director of the Baath party's Security Service and a Shiite from the city of Al Amarah. Saddam related that at the time, the party did not know which members were Sunni or Shiite or Christians. As an example, he pointed out that it was not until later that he learned that one of the party's leaders, Tariq Aziz, was a Christian. The party was successful because it related to the people, and, thus, no distinction was made on members based on their religion or ethnicity.
Saddam related that among the party's leadership between 1958-63, very few members were Sunni. The Secretary General was Shiite from the city of Al Nasiriyah. Saddam claimed that when he attempted to assassinate president Abdul Karim Qasim in 1959, he knew nothing about the Sunnis and Shiites. In 1963, with the exception of two or three party members, almost all members of the Baath party were Shiites. After the revolution, people began inquiring which members were Sunni and which were Shiite. At the time, it was difficult to know because they were all mixed together. However, by 1968, nearly all party members were Sunnis. Because the party had previously operated secretly, few knew or cared about one's religion. However, after the revolution, people in the government began talking more frequently about this issue. Many were concerned that promotions and demotions were being decided on the basis on one's sect or religious affiliation. Saddam stated, "You would be surprised to know that the secretary general of the party in 1964 was Kurdish.''
Saddam was asked about a perception that Kazzar was Saddam's "right-hand man and that at one time, he was considered a threat to take over president Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr's regime. Saddam refuted this characterisation by saying that he was not his right-hand man in the government and that each person has their own duties and responsibilities. He said that although Kazzar was neither a revolutionary nor among the seventy individuals who took over the Presidential Palace, he was a good party member and a tough individual while he was in prison.
Kazzar was not convinced that the military would be good for the Baath party. He was influenced by the thoughts of party members who split and believed in a communist socialist philosophy. Kazzar considered the military members of the party to be old-fashioned and a burden. Despite his perspective, however, Kazzar decided to remain with the party. Saddam had no information whether Kazzar had met with officials in Iran. He related that when Kazzar's coup failed, Kazzar fled to Iran but was arrested before he arrived at the border. Saddam said he did not want to talk "bad about Kazzar. He said that when Kazzar "arrested the Minister of Defence Hamad Shihab and Minister of Interior Sa'dun Gaydan, it was done easily and did not require a big plan.
While discussing Kazzar, Saddam digressed and characterised this period as being the best time for Iraq because "we nationalised oil, settled oil disputes with the oil companies and invested money in Thoura City," which was later renamed, Saddam City.
According to Saddam, the psychology of the Baath party was to recruit young individuals at the beginning of their schooling such as when they were in elementary and secondary school. The party seldom recruited members from colleges. Their philosophy was that they wanted a person they could mould to "grow into the party. In the 1950s and 1960s, the party accepted primarily young people and only a few older individuals.
Some party members such as Kazzar questioned the allegiance of newer officers to the Baath party. The interviewer mentioned to Saddam that many people believed Kazzar's plan to kill Al Bakr went awry after Kazzar learned that Al Bakr's plane had been delayed and then incorrectly assumed that his plot had been exposed. The interviewer continued stating that Kazzar then kidnapped ministers Shihab and Gaydan as hostages and fled to the border of Iran where he was captured by Saddam.
Saddam responded by saying, "Your information is not specific. According to my information, President Al Bakr's plane was not delayed, and his guards were awaiting his arrival." Saddam waited at the airport for Al Bakr and after he arrived, Saddam accompanied him to the Presidential Palace where the two drank tea together. Saddam later excused himself so that Al Bakr could visit his family. Saddam was then driven by his staff through Baghdad.
As they were driving, they heard an announcement on the police radio that a coup had been attempted by ministers Shihab and Gaydan. Because of the importance of this matter, Saddam pushed his driver to the side and proceeded to drive the car himself to his residence which was located near the president's residence. Near the gate of his residence, Saddam used a telephone to call Al Bakr, who asked where Saddam was located because he had something very important to relate. Saddam answered that he was nearby, and that he had heard the news.
Saddam met with Al Bakr at his residence. Al Bakr told Saddam that ministers Shihab and Ghaydan had attempted a coup, saying that he had tried calling minister Shihab, but received no answer. Saddam advised Al Bakr that he had an "intuition about Kazzar and believed it was Kazzar who had attempted the coup, not the two ministers. Saddam subsequently asked Al Bakr to call the Military Division and prepare to go after Kazzar and "to hit him before he crossed the border into Iran."
Near the borders of Iran were tribes where Saddam and Sa'dun Shakir used to go hunting. After the revolution, Saddam had given these tribes many rifles. An announcement was put out on the radio to arrest Kazzar and inform the nearest Baath party unit. Members of a tribe who became aware of this through the radio, saw Kazzar's caravan, surrounded it and detained him. Special Operations helicopters were then dispatched to pick up Kazzar and return him to Baghdad.
After Al Bakr obtained a clear picture of what had occurred, he started crying, picked up his belongings and went from his palace to his residence. According to Saddam, Al Bakr said that he did not want to be president. Al Bakr told Saddam he wanted Saddam to remain in the government so he could slip out." Saddam claimed to have made a similar statement to Al Bakr about also wanting to leave the government.
Following this, Saddam told people not to bother Al Bakr and to let him stay at home. Saddam then began arresting the alleged conspirators of this coup. He called Al Bakr to inform him that some of the conspirators were members of the Baath party leadership. Saddam then began organising a meeting between himself, Al Bakr and leaders of the Baath party Central and National Committees.
Saddam was asked how he knew that Kazzar would be fleeing to Iran. He answered that when the announcement went out on the radio to look for Kazzar, people started calling in sightings of him. Gradually, it was those periodic sightings that led him to believe that Kazzar was heading towards Iran.
Saddam was asked if Kazzar called Al Bakr, and he said, "No." Saddam said that apparently Kazzar's vehicle had become stuck in the mud. When he solicited the assistance of local farmers, they called for help. It was around this time that Kazzar shot Ministers Shihab and Gaydan. Shihab survived by pretending that he was dead.
Saddam was questioned whether Kazzar had called Al Bakr to negotiate the release of the hostages, and at the same time selected Abdul Al Khaliq Al Samarra'i's residence as a place to meet. Saddam denied this, stating that there was announcement on the emergency radio band that a coup had been attempted and that all party members should meet at Al Samarra'i's residence.
Saddam did not know why this house was chosen as the meeting location, but suspected that the party members were being called to one location to be arrested. When asked whether Al Samarra'i was implicated in the coup simply because of the meeting, Saddam answered that a took care of this. Saddam does not remember who headed the "committee", including whether it was Ezzat Ebrahim Al Douri.
Saddam stated, "I do not want to make a mistake on the details regarding something which I am not one hundred per cent sure." Saddam acknowledged that Al Samarra'i had been a Baath member since 1968.
When asked if Al Samarra'i spoke out on issues, Saddam said, "The Baath party talked freely. This is only a media interpretation that people could not talk." Saddam stated that there are members of the party still available, and he suggested that the interviewers talk to them. Saddam was asked if he was surprised by the allegations against Al Samarra'i. He responded, "When we give someone in the party something to do, we trust them. These and other things happen in a revolution.''
Saddam then stated, "Whether I am the first person or the second person, all the questions come back to me. I am not afraid of taking responsibility in front of the law or the people. You have to put blame not just on the leadership, but also on the people who conspired such as Al Samarra'i.
Saddam added, "I want you to understand clearly about the situation. Yesterday, we talked about the fact that Nayif and Hardan were killed overseas. Ebrahim Daud was not killed. If the Iraqi government is being accused of all this, why did they not kill Daud?"
Saddam stated, "As I recall, Al Bakr ruled until 1979 but was not called a dictator, but after I ruled, they called me a dictator." Saddam then asked; "After 1979, who was killed or assassinated inside or outside of Iraq? Who was executed from the Ministries or out of the leadership after 1979?''
Following these questions, the interviewer said that these are unanswered questions which needed to be clarified for the sake of history. Saddam said, "It's not enough to ask me. You should ask other leaders. I advise you to talk to others." Saddam said he was not worried about answering questions. The interviewer told Saddam that he Saddam] was answering the questions for the same reasons they were being asked, for the sake of history. Saddam replied, "Sometimes, you see me upset because some things are dark. During this period, we had good and bad times. We laughed and joked. Al Samarra'i served, and we made jokes with him. He made mistakes. We moved on. I hope you will be just in what history you [the interviewers] write."
The interviewer told Saddam, "Fortunately or unfortunately, I will have a major impact on your history." Saddam agreed and replied, "Nobody can say I have no bias. People think what they want. Everyone has his own opinions. People are not a computer. We all have flesh and blood."
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