Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of a partial withdrawal of Russian forces caught many observers by surprise.
“I think that ... [our] armed forces as a whole have achieved [their] goal,” he remarked. Well. There are some merits to this statement.
Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s regime had suffered severe setbacks on the battlefield prior to Russia’s intervention.
Russia’s involvement succeeded at stabilising vulnerable fronts in favour of the Syrian regime. It also dashed the hopes of those who sought to topple Al Assad or, at the very least, gain an upper hand at the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, in a short span of time, Russia emerged as a global power that could, by using force and withdrawing it when necessary, manage a perilous international crisis that also threatens Western security interests. As a result, Putin is in a significantly better position to tackle Russia’s conflict with the West over Ukraine.
Different theories have been presented to explain the reasons behind Putin’s decision to partially withdraw Russian forces. Some experts maintain that behind-the-scenes negotiations between Russia and the United States were at play. This would mean that the Russians accepted a middle ground with the US in Syria in exchange for the US taking a soft stance towards Russia over the Ukrainian crisis.
Others argue that the move may be purely theatrical, given that Russian forces will not completely withdraw from the Hmeymim airbase near Latakia, nor from the long-standing Russian naval base in Tartus.
Russia will also keep their powerful S-400 air defence system in Syria. As such, the Russians still have the ability to carry out air strikes and even escalate the conflict in a short time.
Another group of observers highlights the economic factors as a decisive component in Putin’s decision. Their argument is that an open-ended war would not be sustainable under the current battered and shrinking Russian economy.
Despite these differing observations, the reality is that the announcement of Russia’s decision just before the new round of peace talks was to open in Geneva was not a coincidence.
Although the above factors may have played a role in Putin’s decision, the most viable explanation is that there were signs that by counting on Russia’s support, Al Assad was trying to establish leverage that would frustrate any political solution. Al Assad’s strategy could have kept the Russians grounded in Syria for maybe years.
In an interview with AFP in February, Al Assad vowed to retake the whole country. Russia’s response was sharp, with an implicit warning tone. “Russia has invested very seriously in this crisis, politically, diplomatically and now also militarily. Therefore, we would like Al Assad also to respond to this,” remarked Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s envoy to the United Nations. He added that the Syrian leader’s stance “is not in accord with the diplomatic efforts that Russia is making”.
Putin’s move signalled a clear message to Al Assad: “We are not here to save your throne. Do not assume that we will support a hardline position you may stake out during negotiations in Geneva.”
On March 8, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) announced that it had successfully test-fired two Qadr long-range ballistic missiles. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015, endorsed the nuclear deal between Iran and the world’s six powers (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA).
According to that resolution, “Iran is called upon — rather than ‘required’ — not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology” until “eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day or until the date on which the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion [on the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme], whichever is earlier”.
The US argued that Iran violated the resolution, and demanded a response by the Security Council. Russia would not budge on the US demand. According to Churkin, “A call is different from a ban, so legally you cannot violate a call; you can comply with a call or you can ignore the call, but you cannot violate a call. The legal distinction is there”.
Space limitations do not permit considerations of technical arguments and counterarguments regarding this issue from a legal perspective. Nevertheless, in practical terms this Russian stance means that the US and its western allies would never be able to penalise Iran on the expansion of its missile programme.
The question becomes, then, whether this position will endure in the months and years to come if Iran intends to take advantage of Russia’s leverage in the UN and expand its missile programme. Is not this position prone to change as a result of future back-door dealings with the West, in particular with the US? In a hypothetical situation, where the US promises to lift sanctions imposed on Russia over their Ukrainian conflict, will not the Russians jettison their relations with Iran for their own interests?
In 2010, despite Iran and Russia’s existing contract for the delivery of S-300 missiles three years prior, Russia’s then president Dmitry Medvedev — under heavy influence of his mentor and then prime minister, Vladimir Putin — suspended and then banned the delivery of the missiles to Iran.
The White House highly praised Medvedev for his leadership, saying in a statement: “This continues to demonstrate how Russia and the United States are cooperating closely on behalf of our mutual interests, and global security.”
It is not clear what sort of deal was made between the US and Russia, but Foreign Policy published an article titled: ‘How the Obama team convinced Russia not to sell arms to Iran’. The article read, “[The Russian decision was] a dividend of the Obama administration’s ‘reset’ policy with Russia”.
Shortly after the finalisation of the JCPOA, in April 2015, Putin repealed the ban prohibiting the delivery of S-300 missile air defence systems to Iran. After changing the delivery dates several times, according to the latest reports, the S-300 system is scheduled to be shipped to Iran in September 2016.
Whether this schedule will be met by the Russians remains to be seen. But Ben Caspit, an Israeli correspondent, reports: “According to senior Israeli sources, with regard to Hezbollah, [the Russians] understand Israel’s stance and are now reconsidering their missile deal with Tehran.”
Putin’s high-profile meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in Tehran in November 2015, was claimed to be “the most important in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran” by the foreign policy adviser to Khamenei, Alai Akbar Velayati. Iran’s leader described Putin as “a prominent figure in today’s world”. He has never praised any foreign leader in this way.
All that said, the Russians are under immense pressure due to the West’s sanctions. Moreover, the next US president — either Hillary Clinton or a Republican backed by a Republican-dominated Congress — will appear noticeably pro-Israel. This will likely result in the Americans taking an aggressive stance toward Iran’s missile programme.
It is difficult to argue that the Russians would not side with the Americans against Iran’s missile programme were the US to promise to remove its sanctions on Russia in exchange.
Such an eventuality will spark a number of troubling questions including: What measures will the UN Security Council adopt against Iran and how will those measures affect the Iran nuclear agreement? Will the agreement hold? Given the Middle East going through its most transformative and turbulent time in its modern history where would a re-escalation of the US-Iran conflict lead the region to?
Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and freelance journalist writing primarily about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs. He is also the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace.