Fear factor coming to the Gulf

In the heated Democratic Primary in Pennsylvania, Hillary Rodham Clinton invoked images of Pearl Harbor and Osama Bin Laden in several television advertisements, which questioned Barack Obama's ability to lead in a crisis.

When asked what she would specifically do if Iran assaulted Israel, Clinton responded: "If I'm the president, we will attack Iran... we would be able to totally obliterate them."

This daring commentary followed John McCain's earlier pledge to eliminate Hezbollah and Hamas, in yet another version of steamroller diplomacy, which promised wars galore.

These comments were fresh in most minds when the head of American diplomacy arrived into Bahrain and Kuwait, pleading with her allies to support Iraq, and warning them about Iran. Were they an indication of continuity no matter who succeeded George W. Bush?

The politics of fear is of course a staple of American politics, and while such pronouncements are not new - one remembers the late September 2004 last minute television advertisements that suggested John Kerry could not defend America against terrorists "who want to kill us" -they do not augur well.

In fact, the American political fear factor is now migrating to the Gulf region, and was on display this past week in Bahrain's capital, Manama, and Kuwait. As expected, the single day Manama conference condemned extremism and terrorism, and committed its signatories to work together to ensure "stability, peace and prosperity in the Middle East."

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice revealed that conversations were frank -which meant a good deal of disagreement - as she goaded Arab states to establish full diplomatic relations with Baghdad at the ambassadorial level, ostensibly to strengthen Baghdad and counter the growing Iranian influence throughout the area.

Her push was echoed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, who expressed bewilderment by current positions, which did not recognise the Iraqi political process but, allegedly, incited strife. Few responded in public.

Rice flew to Kuwait to continue her discussions with a larger group of potential donors who were pressed to cancel old Iraqi debt. She made the case that additional resources were necessary to buttress the fragile republic. Her entreaties failed to break the ice as many wondered how much more they could endure.

Guarantee

To be sure, Gulf Cooperation Council governments want to desperately help Iraq, and have indeed done so on previous occasions, although some conservative Arab monarchies sought assurances that past attacks against Egyptian and Jordanian diplomats would not be repeated.

Since Al Maliki could not guarantee that terrorists would not target Arab diplomats, one can understand their reluctance to deploy under force majeure.

Towards that end, it may be worth recalling that the State Department is having similar difficulties, compelling its diplomats to serve in Iraq, all of whom are protected by both the military as well as a huge force composed of for-hire mercenaries working for major contractors.

GCC leaders argued that they stood by a united Iraq, which included Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites and Christians, though they were disappointed that Al Maliki could not persuade them that Iraq's Sunni community would no longer be discriminated again.

Several encouraged Baghdad and Washington to first tame Moqtada Al Sadr and his Mahdi Army, enhance the Iraqi Army's capabilities to perform as required, and encourage Al Maliki to rule over a "national" government, before passing the plate.

Since Iraq was a very long-term proposition, which would be on the international community's agenda for decades to come, chances were excellent that time would heal today's open wounds. What was far more dangerous were the conflicting perceptions that existed about Iran and its growing regional influence.

Indeed, when Washington reminded its Gulf partners that Arab States must rally against Tehran, few responded because no one could honestly join an anti-Iranian coalition. It may be safe to presume that Washington's representatives once again imparted their very strong lines against Iran.

Naturally, GCC officials were anxious to listen to what the pre-eminent Gulf power - the United States of America - had to say, just as its heads of states heard Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the December 2007 Doha Summit.

Yet, not a single one was ready to embark on an adventure with Tehran, cautioning against ill-advised adventurism. To be sure, GCC governments had differences with Tehran, but they all hoped to resolve them through dialogue.

Iran was a neighbour and would remain one forever and it may be unrealistic to expect an Arab coalition against it.

The only moment of levity during this past week came when Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, the foreign minister of Bahrain - who happens to be a fan of the Dallas Cowboys football team from his academic days in Texas - presented Rice a Bahrain national soccer jersey with the lettering "Condi" and the number "621" printed on its back.

Of course, the number referred to the "6+2+1" talks between the six GCC countries as well as Egypt, Jordan, and the United States.

Clinton, McCain, and those who promote fear probably recall an earlier association, the so-called "6+2" alliance that grouped the GCC with Egypt and Syria, and wonder what happened to its many promises.

They might wish to contemplate that past coercion accomplished little and that chances were excellent for current endeavours to emulate that record.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.