Iran’s potent threats to Saudi Arabia

Daesh (the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), which is neither Islamic nor a state, apparently attacked the Ali Bin Abi Taleb Mosque near Al Qadeeh (close to Al Qatif) in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, killing 21 and injuring more than 100.

Livid at the loss of life, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Saudi King Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, instructed the Crown Prince and Minister of Interior, Mohammad Bin Nayef, to impose the harshest penalty on those who allegedly plotted, supported, cooperated or even sympathised with the criminals. Who stands to gain from this latest atrocity?

According to the Interior Ministry spokesman, Major General Mansour Al Turki, preliminary investigation results revealed that Daesh was the guilty party, although another Saudi officer, Brigadier General Bassam Attiyah, affirmed that Daesh worked on dividing the kingdom along geographical, sectarian and economic lines.

Naturally, while Attiyah advanced the notion that Daesh harboured three clear objectives — target security personnel, incite sectarian strife and kill foreigners — presumably to spread chaos, it was amply evident that a marginal terrorist organisation was not the ultimate decision-maker in the matter.

In fact, the two officers provided details of several recently arrested operatives and linked them with organisations operating out of Syria and Iran.

Targeting Saudi interests is nothing new, though Tehran customarily relied on its militia clients like Hezbollah in Lebanon or Al Houthis in Yemen to vent and strike.

Over the years, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) representatives lashed out at Riyadh, accusing the Saudis of being “treacherous” and, an all-time favourite by any standard, for “following in Israel’s footsteps” since they presumably were “Wahabi-takfiri-sahyuni-amiriki” stooges.

Epithets

In fact, the takfiri (apostasy), sahyuni (Zionist) and American epithets were used so often that Arab comedians delved into various compositions widely available on YouTube and other entertainment channels.

Beyond the comical, however, Tehran perceived Saudi Arabia’s reinvigorated “will-to-power”— which the Economist of London correctly identified as “uncharacteristic boldness” that transformed the kingdom into “the leading force in the Arab world” — as a potential source of aggression that demanded tough Iranian responses which, unfortunately, was bound to raise tensions.

Indeed, the IRGC’s Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari regularly lashed out at Saudi Arabia, and Hezbollah deputy secretary-general Naim Qasim recently warned that Riyadh would “incur very serious losses” and “pay a heavy price” for its Yemen campaign. Ayatollahs and commentators galore added to a long list of threats that, under the circumstances, were perfect excuses for continued warfare.

Of course, the most renowned character who wrote a few scripts of his own was the IRGC Qods Force commander Qasim Sulaimani, whose Damascene and Baghdad excursions took on folkloric features.

Sulaimani deployed in Syria, conducted incredibly sophisticated battles, instructed Hezbollah and Syrian Arab Army operatives and left for Baghdad after divine victories. In Iraq, he engaged the enemy in Tikrit, led armies, liberated cities, cajoled tired devotees and otherwise prepared for his next accomplishments somewhere on the planet.

Sulaimani was not the first such visitor and, lest we forget, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini wrote extensively against the very institution of monarchy. He also authorised Iranian pilgrims to repeatedly demonstrate in Makkah at the height of the Haj, ostensibly to “liberate” the holy city from usurpers, which redefined ugliness.

Even if Khomeini did not directly call on anyone to storm the Grand Mosque at Makkah, confrontations between Shiite pilgrims and Saudi security forces became regular occurrences throughout the last two decades of the 20th century.

Useful lesson

In June 1984, Saudi F-15s shot down two American-built Iranian F-4 fighter jets near an islet named Al Arabiyah, about 96km northeast of Jubail, to prevent an Iranian assault on ships in Saudi territorial waters.

When Tehran sent up 11 more F-4s, Riyadh put 11 F-15s into the air. The standoff ended after the Iranian planes returned home. It was a useful lesson for all concerned and yet Iran continued to challenge Saudi Arabia.

Regrettably, a stampede in Makkah killed more than 400 people in 1987, which further polarised radical Saudi Shiites and, in July 1989, two-dozen Saudi and Kuwaiti Shiites were arrested for smuggling weapons near the Grand Mosque, several of whom were tried, found guilty of terrorism and executed.

Such responses mobilised extremists who then mounted the Khobar Towers bombing near the Dhahran Saudi Aramco headquarters on June 25, 1996. Nineteen US servicemen were killed and nearly 500 individuals of various nationalities were wounded in that attack, and although the late King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz ushered in reconciliation initiatives, the die was cast.

Over the course of several decades, Iran smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia, conducted terrorist operations against Gulf targets and embarked on anti-Arab Gulf policies to assert its hegemony.

It confronted the US directly in the Gulf and when Washington retaliated, Tehran went after pro-western Arab Gulf governments, several of which opted to look the other way.

Until recently, every Gulf Cooperation Council peace initiative was met with fresh instigations. Whether Iranian leaders, especially the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved of these policies is impossible to know although common sense suggests that he did.

Consequently, few Saudis and, for that matter, very few Arabs today perceive Iranian intrusions in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere as signs of Muslim solidarity with the mostazafin — meaning the wretched or dispossessed.

Rather, most Arabs (but not Naim Qasim) saw Iranian interventions in Arab affairs as unwelcome signs, even if in the Gulf, such prying was correctly seen as nothing more that salvos in Tehran’s long-running anti-monarchy outlook.

Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is the author of Iffat Al Thunayan: An Arabian Queen, London: Sussex Academic Press, 2015.